India’s multitude of military and security challenges, with Sushant Singh

Space Summary

The Twitter Space India’s multitude of military and security challenges, with Sushant Singh hosted by thecaravanindia. Dive into the intricate landscape of India's military and security challenges with expert analysis and nuanced discussions presented by India's premier magazine. Explore the multifaceted issues at the intersection of politics, culture, and defense strategies within the country. Gain valuable insights into the complexities of India's national security landscape and the responses to various security threats, providing a comprehensive overview of the defense dynamics in the region.

For more spaces, visit the Alpha Group page.

Questions

Q: What are some key insights into India's military challenges?
A: Delve into the complexities of India's military landscape and its security issues.

Q: How does politics influence India's security strategies?
A: Understand the interplay between politics, culture, and security in India's defense mechanisms.

Q: What are the main security concerns faced by India today?
A: Gain insights into the multifaceted challenges that India encounters in the realm of national security.

Q: How does India respond to security threats?
A: Explore India's defense strategies and its approach to addressing various security risks.

Q: What role does culture play in shaping India's military landscape?
A: Discover the influence of cultural factors on India's security and defense dynamics.

Highlights

Time: 00:15:42
India's Military Challenges Overview Insights into the diverse array of military challenges faced by India.

Time: 00:25:18
Political Influences on Security Strategies Exploring how politics shapes India's security and defense approaches.

Time: 00:35:50
Cultural Aspects of National Defense Understanding the role of culture in shaping India's military landscape.

Key Takeaways

• Insights into India's complex military landscape and security concerns.
• Discussion on the multifaceted challenges faced by India in the realm of national defense.
• Analysis of the intersection between politics, culture, and security in India.
• Exploration of the nuances of India's defense strategies and responses to security threats.
• In-depth understanding of the current military and security dynamics within the country.

Behind the Mic

Introduction to the Event

Hi, everyone. I hope I'm audible to all the listeners here. Welcome to caravans first ever spaces event. And let me introduce myself. My name is Surabhi and I'm the web editor at the caravan. And we are really excited to be doing this. Spaces. And we are hoping that we can have many more of these after this first one. And today on spaces, as you all know, we'll be talking to Sushant Singh, who is our consulting editor and one of India's foremost defence and security journalists. Hi, Sushant. How are you?

Sushant's Introduction

Hi, Surbhi. Thanks. Thanks for having me here. It's wonderful to be here on these places with the caravan. I'm so. I'm glad as well. I think. I'm sure everyone is excited to hear your thoughts, so we'll jump right in. As we all know, we are going to be discussing India's multitude of military and security challenges. And we are hoping, Sushant, to hear from you on everything from Kargil to Kashmir to China and, of course, to some of the recent development. Hello. Am I audible?

Technical Difficulties

Yeah, Survivi, you are audible. Hi, I'm really sorry, everyone. Am I audible? Hello. Yes, Surbhi, you are audible. Yeah, Surbhi, you are audible. I'm sorry about that. Just had a bit of a technical difficulty, I suppose. So, Shant, let's jump right in over here. I think. As you wrote recently for the caravan itself, it's been 25 years since Kargil. And you wrote, very interestingly, in the piece, you talked about sort of how that war had gone down. You had spoken about the. In fact, you had harked back to this very interesting incident from 71 with Bangladesh, where Sam Manekshaw had written to the head of the raw and misses.

Reflection on Kargil War

Indira Gandhi had a very interesting comment on that. Now, I would just like to hear from you, Sushant. 25 years since Kargil. And, of course, it has such a strong image in our public today. You know, even growing up, all of us as young people india would have seen a sort of a very heroic depiction of the army and of Kargil. It has been like. It has been narrativized, it has been visualized in so many different forms. But your piece said a different thing about it. Could you talk about the, sort of the approach of the army during Kargil and the revelation that you had in your piece, which you've reported earlier, which was also that, you know, actually, the army had kept the government in the dark for a very long time when the crisis erupted. And the chief of the army was not even in the country when this happened.

Sushant's Insights

Yeah. Surbhi, it has been 25 years since the Kargil war. And as many of you are aware, I was in the army at that time. And some of the people who died were close friends and coursemates. So, you know, it's a very emotional thing for me personally as well. Although I did not serve during the Kargil war. In the Kargil war as such, I was posted somewhere else. But you know, to look at, look back at Kargil now 25 years later, a lot of time has passed and we should be able to look at it more objectively, more honestly, rather than looking at the manner which you spoke about as kind of, you know, a very jinguistic, nationalistic, you know, kind of talk about the veiler of so and so or, you know, ye dil manga Moore's statement. That cannot be the only way of, you know, remembering the remembering.

Lessons and Mistakes

Remembering the remembering the war. It has to be also about what are, what were the mistakes made and what were the lessons learned. To give you an example, you know, 62 war happened. 25 years after 62 is 1987. By 1987, the India China war, the Sino India war of 1962 that had been analyzed, threadbare people had been massacred. Everything was done. 25 years is a long time. You don't, you know, we should be. We should be far more honest about it. So as far as the issues of what went wrong, what did not go right, I think it is at multiple levels. One of course is at the larger political strategic level. You know, what was being done with Pakistan and how did Pakistan respond to it?

Political and Military Aspects

You know, the fact that we did not expect Pakistan to do this while Mister Vajpayee was inside Pakistan. As Nassim, there are very famous book from Pakistan which has all the details, clearly shows that the Pakistanis were already doing it while Mister Vashpay was traveling to Lahore. So it was at a political strategic level. There was a major surprise in which India was caught with its pants down. India did not expect it to happen at a military level. As I wrote in the Caravan recently, in this month's issue and also online, it is an episode where. Which is not talked about at all. The fact that the army was aware of the ingresses in various areas and kept it hidden from the political leadership or even from the indian air force.

Difficulties in Communication

They were not willing to tell the indian air force they needed the attack helicopters, why they were going to them. And the army chief continued, then army chief General Ved Malik continued to stay out of the country. There are enough memoirs now available of people who served during that time both in the prime minister's office and other places to show that the government was kept in the dark. And as I reported in the Express a few years back, I think in 2018 or something, Manveder Singh, the Jaswant Singh who was then India's foreign minister and Manwindra, former Indian Express journalist and a territorial army officer, also a former member of parliament from the BJP, from Barmaid Jason made Manwe told me that he was called by a brigade.

The Call for Transparency

He was posted army headquarters at that time and he was called by the. He was called by one of the army officers, a brigadier for dinner. And he said that something massive has gone massively wrong in Kargil Dras sector where large number of troops are being inducted and other stuff is happening. And I want you to inform the political leadership of the country. And he says, I came back late at night, did not. Did not disturb my father. Next morning, early morning, I told my father and my father said that he was not aware of anything. He called up George Fernandez on the racks phone and who was the defense minister at that time. And that is when they asked for a briefing and came to know.

Reflecting on Official History

So if you look at those kind of details, there was a lot that went wrong. And even after 25 years, we are just not willing to. We are just not willing to. Willing to talk about it. The fact that the official history of. The fact that the official history of the Kargil war which was written a few years back, seven or eight years back, my friend Srinath Raghavan was commissioned to write it and he wrote the history that history has not been officially released. You know, if Kargil was such a glorious figure, why would you not want its official history to be released? It's something which should have been released.

Media's Role Post Kargil

But my bigger point about the Kargil war is the larger socio political change. It was a turning point in the way India dealt with the military. Kargil fundamentally the way media played the role of a force multiplier. So most people forget that when Musharraf chose to privatize the media, liberalize the private media in Pakistan, it was a direct response to what had gone on india during the Kargil war. The fact that India private media acted as a force multiplier for the military and for the government. You know, playing the nationalistic narrative, playing the narrative, playing the kind of a narrative which gave Musharraf the idea that this is the way to now go not to just depend on state backed media, state owned media.

Shifts in Perception

Right. And that was the big shift that we. That we saw how. How Mediataindev depicted the military. And because of the manner in. In which media depicted the military, how society related to the military, the, you know, the armed forces learned those lessons, and those lessons were then applied in how they dealt with Kashmir, how Kashmir was covered. So everything thereafter, you see post 99, the coverages, you know, everything is a sacrifice. Everything is Vela. Everything is great. You know, exactly. Everything is about nationalism. There is very little that is objectively about the military operations, per se, or the tactical, strategic, political failures.

Kargil as a Turning Point

Failures around this. I can go on and on, Surbhi, but, you know. Yeah, no, that's what I think. It's an interesting point that, you know, of course, about Kargil. I think it's important to discuss this, that 25 years later, we are not just 25 years later. Right. We are 25 years later. Right. Under a particular regime and under a particular kind of regime. So in this moment, I also want to ask you that, do you think an actual historical. Actually factually historical and objective, looking back at Kargil, is even possible? Because, I mean, not only is every depiction of Kargil jingoistic, I don't think we are seeing.

Challenges of Objective History

I don't think we are in an era where even any depiction of a non jingoistic and non valor filled, you know, masculine sort of depiction of the armed forces is even possible. And, of course, I would love to come back to Kashmir after this, because, you know, it has been. It is August, and it's been five years since the abrogation, so we must come to that as well. Sorry, Sushant, just before that, I would like to just encourage all our listeners that if you can, please post any comments and questions in the Twitter thread under the spaces, that would be really helpful.

Engagement with Listeners

And we'll keep looking at it to bring in the points that you all are wanting to raise, but that would really help us. So, Sushant, could you come back to sort of this idea that how can we actually have this objective thing, as you wrote in your own piece? Right. The memoir by the general has been. Has been sort of. It's been lying with the ministry. It's not been allowed to come out. I don't think there are any really objective accounts of our army's doings that are actually coming out or have come out in this regard. Yeah. Surabhino. So wars are tricky to cover.

Nature of Coverage

They are not easy to cover because there’s a lot of sacrifice. You look at the second world war. Most people who look at second world war think that the war was won by the Americans and the Brits, whereas the reality is that the war was won by the Soviet Union. The nazi military war machine would not have been defeated by. Could not have been defeated by the United States or by UK or by any of the western forces. The real battles that took place, Operation Barbarossa or all these other operations, major fights or Stalingra or the battle of Stalingradh, they were essentially the soviet machine, you know, the industrial machine, the soviet military machine, the fact that they could put push in so much, you know, quantum of equipment, so many troops that they could take on the Nazis.

Challenges of Historical Narratives

That is what did the war. So, you know, wars have a nature, by nature, by certain characteristics. There's a lot of propaganda, there's a lot of mythology, especially in the way wars are remembered because they're related to nationalism, they're related to sacrifice. They rely. They're related to how a society perceives itself. But. But that is for the last. That is for the larger, you know, cross section of people, but for certain section of people, a particular, what I would call an intellectual elite, a social elite, or what is generally now called public intellectuals in the much abused term.

Importance of Objective Assessment

It is for those people to be able to objectively now look back and look at those things. Is it possible to do so? Yes, of course it is possible to do so. If you are not. If you are not willing to be a handmaiden of the government or a propagandist of the government or what ravish Kumar said, be the go the media. If you are not the laptop dog media. And if you care for this country, you care for the people of this country, you care for the armed forces of this country, you care for the strategic interests of the country, you would definitely be able to look at it objectively, because if we do not look at it objectively, we would, you know, more often than not end up in situations like eastern Ladakh with China for what has gone on for four years.

Consequences of Ignoring History

You know, the fact that if we do not physically examine and improve, we will make, we will repeat those mistakes and we will perhaps make even bigger mistakes. So to avoid those bigger mistakes, which are really disasters for our country, you need to be objective about it. You need to be honest about it. You need to put people in the box and ask them the kind of questions which would embarrass them, which would embarrass the government, and which would perhaps embarrass the country as well. I think, Sushant, this is something that we have actually discussed, really, or government's interest.

Kashmir and Current Situation

Right. The problem is very visible. If you look at something like you mentioned, like Kashmir, like the lessons of that has been applied there. It's been five years since abrogation, and I recently visited Kashmir for the very first. And as I was telling you the other day that, you know, it's. It was very evident on any basic conversation with anyone who is actually residing in Kashmir that there is a palpable sense of anger, of disappointment, of hopelessness, and, of course, a volatility that is something that people are just ignoring.

Perceptions in Kashmir

Our media and the mainstream India is just absolutely ignoring. No one in Kashmir that I met thought that the situation was in any way better. It was not in any way stable. In fact, everybody has spoken. It is so unstable that they are actually worried what is going to set off the next big issue over there. You know, what, like, happened with nineties, in the nineties. And you, of course, were posted there in the last. Do you think you could, you know, talk about Kashmir a bit as well? Five years in segregation and also what has been the situation in the last few decades?

Understanding Kashmir Militancy

You know, so essentially, the. The Kashmir militancy, you know, and. Or what now the government's favorite term is terrorism, and it is not terrorism. We should be very careful with the kind of words that we use. It is not terrorism. It is militancy. It is armed militancy or insurgency. That is what would more accurately describe what is. What is. What is going on in Kashmir. So fundamentally, what is being done is that the security forces and the army, the russian rifles, whatever you may have kind of forces are being pushed to the front to cover up for a political failure.

Shift of Focus from Political Challenges

So when you. When you see this, you know, conversation around, oh, what's going on in the Jammu region or what's going on in Rajori or what's going on in Anant Nag. You know, it's essentially being made out as some kind of security challenge which has not been dealt adequately by the security forces. You know, because, you know, certain formation, certain amount of soldiers have gone on to the China border. There are gaps. All the Pakistanis sending militants which are like 80ft tall and are so well trained that they are.

Political Malaise in Kashmir

That they are. And I have seen this for last 30 years. This is the usual narrative. So the idea is to shift the attention, shift the focus away from the political challenge and focus on what is essentially a symptom the security situation is a symptom of a larger political malaise. And what we have seen over the last 1011 years, and particularly in the last five years, as you said, is essentially a political failure. And you do not want to. And you do not want to talk about that political failure.

Media Dynamics and Public Perception

And so you are putting the security forces with all the spotlight on them and talking about everything. And of course, the security forces or people who are leading the security forces in those areas love to talk about it because this brings them attention, this brings them award. This makes them feel good about the fact that we are the ones going to it, essentially. What is the role of security forces in an internal security, or accountant suggestive that their essential role is to bring down violence to a level where normal, routine political activity can resume.

Historical Context of Security Forces

That is. That is how India has dealt with everything. You look at Mizoram, you look at Nagaland, you look at Manipur, you look at Punjab, you know, there are n number of examples, but that is not. The case in Kashmir at all. I mean, so in case of Kashmir, this is exactly what was being done when, you know, when the elections were being held earlier or when some sense of normalcy was being. Was being thought of by a. By a kind of political engagement or by saying that what more can be done that has essentially been thrown out of the window.

Concerns Over Violence in Kashmir

How much more violence can really come down? What are we talking about? 70 militants, 50 militants? Please do not forget that by 2002, 2003, were talking about 3000 deaths in a year in Kashmir. And now we are talking about, what, 30 deaths, 40?

Violence in Kashmir

That, I don't know, maybe 100. So, you know, the fact that violence is at a manageable level, the violence in Kashmir is actually lower than at many other places. The fact is that the government of India, for its own reason, the current government, because it sees there are two distinct audiences. It is. It is. It is looking at. One is the audience in the rest of the country, the. The Hindu majority narrative that this government creates. And the other audience is within Kashmir. It doesn't care for the most for the audience in Kashmir. It only cares. Whatever is being done in Kashmir is being played on a screen which is visible to a larger audience, which it believes, you know, can further its Hindu nationalist majoritarian agenda. So that is why it doesn't care for what is going on in Kashmir. It is more about the real estate than about the people of Kashmir. I do not see any conversation about the people of Kashmir. I only see conversation about real estate. That is essentially about Kashmir.

Comparison Before and After Abrogation

Yeah, that is essentially how it's said, you know, so it is really that sort of thing that is playing out. And of course, it's a big theater, as has been made evident for the rest of the country. And. But do you think that the situation, I mean, how do you compare the situation to before abrogation? I mean, of course the anger is something that we all, you know, anybody willing to pay even a little bit of attention would know about. But how do you compare the situation from before 2019 to now, otherwise, in terms of the security establishment and the agencies functioning over there? So firstly, anger in Kashmir has been there since what, 1953 maybe, I think so. Anger, the level of anger can vary, but the anger. But the anger has never coming down to a more, you know, to a more direct answer to your question.

Political Movement and Violence Levels

I think by around 2008 or nine, I think Omar Abdullah was the chief minister. Around that time, there was one major protest. But by that time, the violence levels had come down significantly. They were at the lowest ever levels. Even before militancy had started in the late eighties, early nineties, they were at the lowest ever levels. And I think that was the time when political movement, political engagement needed to take place. So in that sense, we had seen, were at the lowest levels of violence. Then, of course, after the Burhan Vani episode, violence increased, street protests increased. And what we saw after 2019 is a very high level of oppression, very high level of control, whether on the media, whether on civil society, whether on the local politicians. So they are the, essentially, you know, there is a, there's a complete, you know, a lid has been put on what is going on? What is, what is, what is going on in Kashmir?

Security Challenges and Political Context

Is it a major security challenge which is going to throw India off or Kashmir is going to go away from India? No, it is still, the number of incidents which are happening are still single digits, very low. It does nothing pose an, exist, pose an existential challenge. Challenge for India as a country or for India's territorial integrity or India's. Or India's. India's sovereignty. So I do not see it. I do not see it. Anyway, a comparison to what was happening in the early 1990s when people were talking about, you know, that we should, we will keep the cotton bales here or we, our watches will have Pakistani time or we'll have Pakistani rupees. Since then, situation has changed. Pakistan has changed. Pakistan has gone down. India has become stronger. Indian economy has become stronger.

Changing Dynamics in Jammu and Kashmir

The Line of Control has been fenced the number of Indian forces which are in Jammu and Kashmir are much higher. You know, so all kinds of the global narrative post 9/11 has changed about. About insurgencies, especially, you know, in Muslim majority regions. Whole host of things have happened. So right now, what is happening, you know, this is a minor, you know, minor uptick or a minor rise in the Indic, in the violence that we are seeing, which is happening in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the Jammu region. But it is not really something which should throw us off balance and say, oh, we cannot hold elections or we cannot undertake any political activity. The fundamental point that I'm making, Turbi, is that essentially Kashmir should be looked at as a political challenge, and we should not allow this conversation around security forces and violence to derail conversation or attention from the political failure that J and K. Today is.

Political Engagement and Failure

Can you just. I mean, we will, lots of our listeners want to hear about, obviously, one of the biggest things that we must discuss, which is China. But just before we come to that, just want to. I just want to spell it out for us, you know, what is the political failure that has happened and what is the biggest political failure? Because the only thing that we hear is the only thing being reported in the media is the secure, the challenges, the idea that this is an unsafe place, that there are so many security incidents, that people's lives are at risk, that there is a militancy, that this is a, you know, sort of this or absolutely nothing else. So what is the political failure? If you spell it out for, you know, for us survey, you should. Read the right kind of media, read the caravan, read Jitender Corthus story about how the, you know, those Muslim Mendez Gujars were picked up and tortured and killed, the story which was, which the government told us to take down.

Engagement and Democracy

So, no, essentially the political failure essentially means, you know, you start engaging with a cross section of people, or what the government loves to call all stakeholders in the social and political landscape of the state, that engagement is just not happening. You allow freedom of speech, you allow free rights, you allow, you know, you allow all kinds of. You allow protests on Palestinian issue, you around Jama Masjid to happen, you allow education to happen. Everything which a normal democracy allows because violence level has come down. What we would expect from any liberal democracy, those kind of processes and those kind of things should take place. For that, you need to build an environment of trust. For that, you need to have a political leadership which is willing to walk more than half the way to say, okay, we want to engage with the. With the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Role of Media and Political Solutions

We want to believed that their democracy here or whatever their aspirations are, whatever their grouses are, we are willing to listen to them and let's find a solution. Rather than saying, okay, if you have a grouse, I'm going to come and slap you. That's not the answer. So the essential answer, you know, and this is not just about wipes. This is just not about, you know, this can't be the Supreme Court of India just doing wipes based justice. You know, this is actually, I'm saying this requires a hardcore stuff. This requires going down on the ground, having the right kind officials, having the right kind of people, having the courage to allow the media to come and criticize you, having the courage to have civil society institutions work on you, to bring people, political prisoners out of the prisons, out of those prisons that you have put them in. You have the robust NHRC which talks about human rights violation, and you give a roadmap.

Future Political Conversations

You say, no, we have a political process that will bring down the level of security forces there and we will have a conversation. Whether the conversation is going to be with the government of India, whether the conversation is going to be with the home minister or somebody else or an interlocutor or a back channel conversation, those kind of processes have to be put in place where people see certain kinds of hope for the future, a certain answer that they can get. Those answers are not forthcoming at all. What is the future? What is the current Indian government's vision for Kashmir? I don't know. I'll come and slap you. No, it sounds. I mean, what you're describing sounds like a fantasy compared to what we are actually seeing.

Narratives and Government Control

Right. Which is a tightly government controlled narrative. And of course, like you mentioned, Jatinder's story, which was a recent report published in the caravan about the torture of people. I mean, it's obviously extremely disturbing. And it was clamped down upon to a level that of course, we received a notice and had when were forced to take the story down. So the kind of torture that it was revealing, the kind of treatment that, you know, the security forces are mating out to the people, which of course, any of us would know has been happening for a number of years. The difference in this was this is the Gujarat Bakarwal community, which has been very supportive of Indian security forces.

Tensions with Local Communities

They have always helped the Indian state. They have always helped the Indian army, particularly in dealing with infiltrators or Pakistan big militants you Pakistan backed militants, you actually targeted them, tortured them, killed them. You know, this is something which is. Which is beyond the pace. Why would you hurt someone or, you know, damage your relationship with someone who's helping you work in that area? That is the kind of thing which we are seeing, which is far worse than anything what we would have witnessed in the 1990s or later about which, you know, human rights, amnesty and other human rights bodies have. Have written about and spoken about, of.

Political Disregard and Context

Course, which also, I think, comes back to the sort of grand point that you were. The broader point that you were making, which is that there is a political failure, a complete unwillingness to engage with the people, and there is a complete sort of disregard for any of these people, any of their interests, any of their aspirations and any. Of course. Of course, for the, you know, political establishment, it is only about creating the narrative that will help them in mainstream India. So I think when it comes to Kashmir, and as you said, of course, there is this big question of a narrative that the government wants theater that they are playing out for India to see that, you know, this is what we are doing.

Border Issues and Soldier Access

This is who we stand for. This is what we stand for. And, of course, that same sort of thing is visible. Of course, many people are waiting for us to come to this in what has been happening on the China border for the last several months. So, as you wrote, Sushant, you. I mean, you've done so much work on this subject itself. And, of course, because the border crisis, you have written. You've written a long form cover story for caravan last year, and you also have been coming back to what has been happening on the border in your columns. And you mentioned in a recent column that Indian soldiers can no longer access 40% of patrolling points on the Ladakh border, which they could until 2020. And that, of course, that there have been about 20 rounds of talks between military commanders, and the Chinese have sort of refused to stop blocking Indian patrols.

Government Denial and Accountability

So instead. So what are the failures? Can you talk about what is happening and where the Indian establishment is failing? Because the narratives we know, but what is the reality is actually talked about very sparingly? So I don't think on eastern Ladakh there's any narrative. What I see from the government is denial and essentially a refusal to talk about the situation altogether. There is no other narrative. I have not heard of a narrative where the government is saying, oh, that all our patrols are going fine or our soldiers are not deployed, or the Chinese have gone away. So we have not seen I really don't know what the government narrative is.

Border Control and Patrol Points

I think once Mr. Modi tried it on 19 June 2020 in the all party conference, saying after that, I don't think they have tried that narrative to say that nothing has happened at all. I think the idea is, let's not talk about it, let's bury it under the carpet. The situation, as I know, I wrote a cover story for the caravan. The situation, as you know, is there are 65 patrolling points on the, in eastern Ladakh, on the Sino India border. And these patrolling points for people who do not understand, are not essentially on the line of actual control. Some of these petrol, these patrolling points are essentially where your petrols go up to say that, you know, this area belongs to us and we have come here and we have demonstrated our presence.

Demonstrating Control and Territorial Issues

These are not areas where you get deployed. These are not areas where the military is permanently there, but you just demonstrate your control by going to these areas and also for the future negotiations. You want to say that this used to be our area. That's why we used to come here. So what the Chinese have done is out of those 65 patrolling points, 26 of those patrolling points, we are unable to access on the board. And this is not what I am saying. This is what the ten SP of Ladakh said in her report to that IB organized conference which was publicly available and then taken down by the government. And nobody has still till date denied it.

Control and Demonstration

Nobody has till date rebutted it. And that essentially is the fact. So how do you demonstrate that you control territory? You demonstrate either by deploying there, you go and plonk yourself there, sit your sit there. That is one thing. The second way is you send patrols. Third way is you do technologically, you have drones or you have other areas, radars, where you can keep everything in check. And if somebody comes in, you go there. And the third way that I said is by doing patrols. So India demonstrates its control over these territories in eastern Ladakh, which it believes belong to India by sending patrols.

Challenges in Territorial Defense

Once your patrols cannot go to these areas, it essentially means that you do not exercise control over that territory. So the big problem is people say, oh, have we been thrown out of the territory? Every inch of territory is not occupied. We are not playing ringer Inger roses here, that everybody is going to hold hands and then say, you know, we are going to be going to defend territories. Territories are, you know, you occupy areas which are easily defendable. We know which are on a certain height, etc. Etc. A lot of tactical factors operate, what your logistics lines are, where your lines of communication are, where your commander can get across to you, etc.

Impact on Armed Forces

Etcetera. What essentially is done is you demonstrate your control of territory. And that demonstration of control of territory that is not happening in eastern Ladakh. That is the big one. So essentially when our patrols are unable to go this is what happens. And of course along with that the fact that the Chinese came in so quickly and moved into all these areas to deny us these patrolling rights firstly by deployment and secondly by creation of buffer zones through disengagement has meant that we have been forced to push up our soldiers all along the Sino India border. So no, what, because you are worried that if you are not there present in almost on the front line the Chinese will again come and nibble some other territory somewhere by stopping your patrols in some other area or coming and sitting somewhere else.

Strategic Military Position

So you are essentially on and you don't have a way of throwing out the Chinese. You don't have a way of doing a quid pro cooperation or throwing the Chinese out. So what you essentially do is you go and deploy yourself further and further up. Now what the cost of this is, one is the cost that we spoke about is in Jammu and Kashmir where, you know, your forces are moved out. The uniform forces moved out of Udampur region into southern part of the eastern Ladakh or even in Manipur where they fall where one of the divisions had moved out to the, to the Arunachal border. So you know the.

Military Deployment and Readiness

So the one is your forces move out. The second is it puts your army and the armed forces understream. You know, the armed forces are already deployed in Jammu and Kashmir on the line of control to Pakistan, you know, in northeast and elsewhere. So what happens is that rather than soldiers getting time to rest, recoup, come down on peace postings have the usual peace field cycle of deployment. They are being forced to spend more and more time in operational areas in these tough areas. And as anybody who has served in high altitude for a period of time knows it is not easy to spend extended periods of time. There are stresses, there are strains.

Pressure on Armed Forces

They are under tremendous pressure and this is going to have a cost on the armed forces itself, especially with Agnipath and with these, you know, shortage of soldiers that we are talking, that we are hearing about. I don't know Subi, if you are aware the government is now refusing to give the numbers of soldiers it has in the armed forces for the first time in parliament because the shortages are so high. It doesn't want to talk about that. So you have a shortfall in the armed.

Questions from the Audience

That actually. Yeah, that actually kind of brings me to sort of. We are getting some very good questions. So I want to start sort of posing some of these to you. What do you think? I mean, when you are looping in Agni Veer, of course, like, do you consider this, can you talk about. Someone was also wondering what the ramifications of these changes will be for situations like China, you know, the China border. And also, could you talk about sort of, is this also a political failure according to you? I mean, of course, I think I know your answer, but could you talk about why this failure is happening, where it's stemming from?

Political Leadership Responsibilities

So, you know, essentially all failures are political failures in a democracy or even in any form of government because the political leadership has to take a call and decide what it wants to do. So, you know, why. Where the, where the political failure essentially is a kind of belief that I am. Mister Modi is very friendly with President Xi. And by the sheer force of his personality and by having the kind of personal ties that he has with President Xi, there is going to be no problem. Because, you know, I. I've invited him to Chennai. We have had the broken bread there. I've gone to Shang and I've gone to. I've gone to. I have great ties.

Misassumptions regarding International Relations

And, you know, this is, this will overcome all the other structural problems. So clearly, that is a. That is a wrong assessment and that is a. That is a. That is a political failure. The second political failure, I think is not. Not taking the public, you know, by keeping the people in the dark, you have created an idea as to what all has gone wrong. We really even don't know, you know, how bad the situation is. Whereas what you want as a democracy is people behind you, country behind you. If, let's say there was a unanimous resolution in parliament after discussion talking about it, wouldn't that be wonderful? You know, that would strengthen Mister Modi's hands in negotiations with China or Jashankar's dealings with China.

Weakness in Negotiation Strategies

Rather than trying to, in this false pride fall, pretend as if everything is fine. You are actually weakening your position. The Chinese know that you don't want to tell the people. Not only the Chinese, even the Americans know that you don't want to tell your people. So they know that's a weakness that you have and they can take advantage. They can take advantage of those weaknesses.

Political Failures and Analysis

So that is the second political failure which is very obvious to me. And third, political failure is what journal Narvane wrote about in his memoirs, which have not been published so far. I don't know how much time the government takes to read those 300 pages that because they have not finished reading them, even after whatever, six, say, nine months, the book has not yet come out. But whatever the extracts came out in PTI earlier this year very clearly showed, rather than giving him clear directions or clear bounds as to what he should do or should not do, they just told him, do as you deem fit in August 2020. Now, that's not something political leaders do. You don't leave it to the. You don't leave it to the army chief to decide whether you go to war, whether you open artery fire or not. That is something political leadership does. That is the job of the political leadership to look at the economic conditions, to look at the diplomatic conditions, to look at the geopolitical situation, to have your own assessment of China and do that. So I think these are very clear evidences of. Evidence of political failure. But the biggest political failure is to not understand China and to keep the people in the dark.

Communication Between Government and Military

So, Sushant, I think one thing that somebody is asked as well, I think it's. It's a question that we are seeing. So today. Now you are saying that, for instance, the government's communication with the army has been with the military has been sort of to say, to not give clear directions today, is the. Is the reverse channel sort of still similar to what it was earlier, you know, where, with the Manwinder Singh coming and telling his father that this is what's happening and then the government finding out? Or are we seeing. I mean, someone had asked that, is it easier today for critical information to come up naturally up the system, rather than rely on the son of a minister? And I'm asking this because with this government and with this prime minister, it does not seem as if anybody tells or says anything that they don't like to hear. There doesn't seem to be any space for any kind of back and forth. And it seems that, you know, communication goes one way, orders go one way. So what do you think is happening in the communication between the army and the government?

Historical Context and Current Dynamics

So, you know, I don't think in the Vajpayee government, because it was a government with only 182 MP's. 181. 182 MP's. You know, the ministers were far more powerful. Somebody like Jaswant Singh could dissent in a ccs. You know, if you go to and read Aswan Sinar's memoirs. You will see CCS meetings, a cabinet committee on security meeting six eight times on a single issue and people dissenting within the ccs vote being done in the ccs. I don't even know what kind of voting or discussion is taking place in ccs under Mister Modi. So I don't think ministers sons would have the right now to the kind of access to go up to Mister Modi or to anyone to tell him other than maybe Jaisha. He may have those. He may have that access. I don't know. But other than that I doubt if the minister son would also have the access. What would be the line of communication of the army with the government?

Intelligence and Information Flow

I think more than the army. I think the advancement in the kind of intelligence surveillance facilities that have taken place. I'm sure the intelligence agencies in today's India because of the technical intelligence, because of cooperation with foreign governments like the United States and Israel would have the kind of information available that they can easily inform the government. So it doesn't necessarily have to be the army like in 1999. It could be other agencies of the government, of the establishment which could bring people up to date or the fear that other agencies could bring the government up to date or keep them informed that the whatever. Whether it is the military or whether it is some of the border security force or some other paramilitary force they may go and inform the government fearing the fact that the government will any case come to know about it. The fact that satellite technology monitoring is really from 99 in those 25 years it has really grown in leaps and bounds. I don't think the situation is similar to what it was in 99. In that sense I'm not privy to how the government works within. And even in that case I came to know about what happened in Kargil.

Politico-Military Relationship

So that was a question from Mister Akar Patel. I'd like to also add here a question by the twitter handle I'm reading out is apoorv Thakur and the question is to do with something you had mentioned earlier which is what kind of ramifications will political changes to the military like Agni Veer lead to? And you mentioned for instance the kind of anger. I mean a. There is this idea that we must take the public together which by which you mean probably the larger public. But also what is happening within the military? What sort of. What is Agni Veer leading to? Is there a dissatisfaction within the establishment itself? So you know, even so, I don't know about the level of dissatisfaction within the. Within the institution, about the agniway. I think, very honestly, people have spoken about it. People have indicated about it. The fact that, you know, somebody with. Who's going to serve only for four years, with six months of. Six months of training at a very low salary, competing with his own mates, with his own comrades for being one in four to get permanently absorbed into the army, is going to create problems.

Concerns Within the Military

So the fact that people from traditional recruiting areas are not willing to join. As many reports in the wire, there was a whole series of reports that the wire. You know, so those kind of. Those kind of. Those kind of things are very clear. The fact that nepalese Gurkhas are not joining, the fact that our Gurkha regiments are being forced to take Garwalis and Kumayonis in their place, in place of. In place of the Gurgas. So, essentially, try to think of it in this manner. You know, that this is a very old institution which has formed a particular way of operating, a particular culture of operating over the last, you know, whatever, 100 5200 in case of Gulkhast, 275. So, you know, that culture, the way the army operates, the way the armed forces operate, that has not been changed.

Organizational Culture and Change

You have just changed one part. You have tinkered with one part to save pensions in the future and to bring down the salary bill, but you have not really changed the organizational culture and the norms on which the army operates. The idea of leadership operates. And I think that is where the big problem, big dissonance is coming. Coming. There have been. I believe there have been some studies done by the armed forces themselves. The army has themselves done these studies. They have made certain recommendations. Nothing has happened on those recommendations. I don't know what has happened to the committee of secretaries which was supposed to give its recommendations. What I fear is that the focus is on the political side, you know, because there was so much of anger in these recruiting areas during the recent Lok Sabha elections.

Political Response to Recruitment Issues

The idea is somehow, if we can give them permanent jobs or offer them some kind of, you know, that after Agniweed, you will get preference in a state government job, or, you know, or in paramilitary forces, that anger should subside. There is no attention on what this change, new scheme of having a four year contractual soldier or a four year contractual recruit does to the armed forces. I have not seen a single recommendation about that. The whole conversation is, oh, I'll give you a job, or I'll give you a better. This thing maybe I'll give you more money when you die as an agniweet. But that is not the point here. The point is what it does to the armed forces as an institution, what it does to the military, and what effect it has on national security. And how are you going to mitigate that? Fundamentally, it comes to this.

Implementation of Agniveer Scheme

Surbhi, don't, was a study carried out before Agniwir scheme was implemented? Was there a roadmap for implementation of Agniwir scheme? Or was this being done like demonetization? You know, like, I will announce demonetization, then I will change goals every day saying, today it is digital India, next day it is something else, next day it is black money. Third, it is real estate. You don't run military like that. You don't run national security like that. And I think that is what the governance model essentially has boiled down to. You know, the way we do demonetization, the way we do gst, the way we do farm laws, with the same way we are going to do Agniweep. This looks like a brilliant idea. It will save us some money. Let's go ahead and do it. You know, nobody talks about what the consequences are going to be, and you actually push it over.

Consequences of Policy Decisions

The. Over. The opinion of the. Of the. Of the service, then Navy chief is on record. General Narvan is on record. They were not agreeing to what was being done because they knew what the cost of this sudden change would be. But I think that is the kind of governance we have seen for the last ten years, that as long as PR and propaganda works, nothing else matters. Sushant, I think this kind of reminds me of the recent story you had done as well, another cover story you had done for the caravan, about how the military is sort of falling in line with Modi's political project, where you had covered some of this stuff about how there have been some massive changes in the way that the army is not only dealing with things, but the way, not only how is the army being dealt with, but the way that the army is dealing with things, including everything from China to Kashmir.

Military's Role in Political Affairs

Could you talk about that a little bit? So, you know, the fact that the political leadership is controlling the controlling army or asking the army to behave in a particular the armed forces, rather, to behave in a particular manner is pretty obvious. Is pretty obvious to us, to all of us. The way it has been used for those selfie scheme, the way the defense ministry was used for promoting the. Promoting the selfie scheme or a particular narrative, the way during the. During the COVID During the COVID pandemic, the four service chiefs were put out to do a put up to do a press conference. Conference and talk about, you know, Shah, whatever they. This, you know, they used military helicopters to sharp flowers over hospitals, etc. Etc.

Public Relations and Military Operations

Or for swaksh Bharat or for, you know, whatever, you know, all those slogans which we keep on hearing, every. Every new slogan comes up before the. Before the old. Before the. Before the old one goes. The military is being. Is being. Is being used to further that that kind of definitely being used to further that kind of politics. But even beyond that, I think there is a larger ideological viewpoint of a hindu nationalist country, a de facto Hindu Rashtra, within which the military is being bolded, whether it is by, you know, selecting military chiefs without seniority, you know, people who are not the senior most being picked up or the kind of loyalty that is being expected of the people.

Ideological Influence Over Armed Forces

Or some of these statements that you see coming from. Coming from senior military officers very clearly shows that a larger, you know, ideological imprint is being. Is being imposed upon the. Upon. Upon the armed forces. So please try and understand. So by nature, armed forces are conservative. By nature they are nationalist. And it is, you know, and it is true globally. It is as true in China, in United States, in Sweden, in Finland. You go name the country. The armed forces are by nature conservative. They are, by nature nationalists. So it is, of course, very easy for them to fit in with the idea of a strong man, with the idea of, you know, very robustness, very strong arm tactics.

Military Alignment with Political Ideology

It really appeals to them. It fits very naturally with them. And when a government of the day is an ideological government and it is really wanting to shape the country in the form of its ideology, it will do the. It does. It, of course, does the. Does the same to the. To the military. The fact that 14 retired army chiefs were there in Ayodhya when the temple was inaugurated at the site of the Babri mosque had been demolished. And they were putting up and they were putting up their pictures there. That was something which was, you know, which was a very clear signal as to.

Cultural Shifts in Military Representation

As to. As to. As to how far. How far things have gone or the way the movies are being made, kind of movies that are being promoted, whether it was a movie on surgical strike, whether it was a movie on, you know, on other issues dealing with the kind of movies that are not being allowed to happen or the kind of books that are not being allowed to publish or the kind of reporting that are not allowed to be happened very clearly shows that a certain kind of narrative, a certain kind of worldview is being. Is being imposed and is being promoted, and the military is being shaped. At least an attempt is being made to shape the military in that manner.

India's Approach to Neighboring Countries

And other than that, the big idea, big lesson from Bangladesh should be essentially about how India deals with other neighboring countries. Whether it is Nepal, whether it is Sri Lanka, whether it is Maldives, you know, Bhutan. How do you deal with these countries? Can you really act as this big bully and, you know, pummel them into submission and say, no, listen to me, I'm going to do this, or pick your. Pick your people that I'm only going to work with this guy. I'm not going to work with this guy. I'm going to work with Prachanda, I'm not going to work with Uli or I'm going to work with Siri Sen, but I'm not going to work with Prim Das or whatever.

Building Relationships vs. Backing Specific Leaders

So the idea that we are going to pick some people and then we are going to back them rather than forming deeper ties with the. With all the. With all the stakeholders and all the people in the country and essentially not lose the people while winning over the government. Now, this used to be China's problem, that it had great ties with the governments but was very unpopular with the people. India used to be the other way around. India used to be popular with the people and, you know, even if it was not having great, you know, great ties with the government in the neighborhood, it would be very popular with the people of people at the time.

Current Perception of India in Bangladesh

What is now gone is that we are not popular with the people and we are not popular with the people primarily because our home minister has called bangladeshis termites. The fact that we have a law like CAA, which targets Bangladeshis along Pakistanis and Afghanistan. Now, do you really expect Bangladeshis to love you if you call them termites like this, is slightly. I think the expectation is completely misplaced. So we have created an environment where we think disdainfully about our neighborhood, about our smaller neighbors.

India's Status in the Region

We really think that we are some big data, whereas we are not. We are relatively a declining power compared to China in the neighborhood. So, you know, the further you go from our neighborhood, India is seen as a power which is emerging because India is, you know, in absolute terms, India is increasing economically, militarily, diplomatically, etcetera, over the last 30 years. But when you come to your own neighborhood, India is a relatively declining power.

India's Perception Compared to China

Visa Vi China, because China has grown much faster, is much bigger, six times bigger economy, so on and so forth. So you are relatively declining power in your own neighborhood where you behave in a manner where you think that, you know, you are this some kind of, you know, some. Some kind of an emperor of the region. You are not an emperor of the region. This is not Akhan Bharat. This is South Asia. And you need to deal with that. With South Asia.

India's Image and Declared Relations

Yeah, this kind of comes to another question by the Twitter handle. I hope I'm saying this correctly, RK Polasa, which was that, you know, I mean, and also what you said, which is that India is sort of, you know, behaving like this bully that we want to work with this or that or, you know, clearly having on sort of a declared association with the Sheikh Hasina government or with a particular political establishment, but everyone except our government. Is. Is that actually how it is?

Acknowledgment of Shifting Influences

I mean, is it actually a bully, or is that the narrative? Because everyone except our government is able to acknowledge that we've lost area to China. So where is it. Where is this going wrong? This was the question from one of our listeners, and I think that, you know, this is something that is the. Is it a bully or is it pretending to be the bully? No. Being a bully or being. Acting aggressively appeals a lot to the. To its core.

Core Supporters and Aggressive Politics

To its core supporters. You know, how do you. How do you keep your core base enthused? Other. Other than by talking about. Talking about, you know, smaller neighbors or Bangladeshi Muslims or Hindus being targeted in Bangladesh or, you know, the. The Waxworth, everything, essentially, eventually, you know, you are looking at your core supporters and you want to enthuse them. You want to keep them enthused by. By doing stuff which appeals to them.

India's Failure to Bully Effectively

I don't think even if India is a bully or it tried to bully Nepal or it tried to bully Maldives, it has not succeeded. You know, the fact that in Maldives, you had to pull out all your military personnel, who would, you know, who were running those helicopters and, you know, and aircraft and replace them with civilians? You know, the. The fact is that the press that the Maldives president was, you know, could force you to do. Could force you to do that.

Nepal's Stance and India's Influence

The fact that Nepal refused to become a. Become a hindu republic, it said, no, we are going to remain a secular republic despite that. Then foreign secretary Jaishankar going and reading the riot act or blocking every. Or blocking Nepal or blocking trade all the land routes to Nepal that did not. That. That did not happen. And you've seen this very recent letter by Kanak Mani Dixit and others very clearly calling out India's bullying.

Consequences of India being a Failed Bully

So even if India is trying to act like a bully, it has not been a successful bully. It has not been like the United States acting like a bully and being successful. You know, if you are going to act like a bully, at least be a good bully and be successful. If you're going to be a failed bully, then it really doesn't work out. Sure. Another Twitter. Sorry.

Concerns on Bangladesh's Stability

Another person on the space has asked us, I'm sorry, I'm not able to pronounce their handle name, but they're asking that Sheikh Hasina has made allegations against the role in her ouster. So how do you think the instability in Bangladesh will affect our internal security. And what if the new government allows it to become another Pakistan? That's the question that we've received. Would you like to talk about this?

Possible Outcomes of Bangladesh's Government Change

So I don't know about the verisity of Sheikh Hasina's claim about the US space. There is no other. I think even the indian intelligence officials or indian security officials have been silent about it. They've not spoken. They're not spoken about that, about the fact that the Americans were looking for a base. Americans have a base in Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean, not very far off.

US Presence and India's Response

And if the Americans want to be deployed in that ocean, if they could come in 1971 with their 7th fleet, they can still come with their aircraft carriers and what have you from the Indo Pacific for the Indo Pacific command. So it is not something that they definitely need a base. And that's why. Why they plotted her out. It doesn't meet the smell test to my mind.

Reacting to Claims and Public Perception

It does help her kriya. It does help her create a narrative saying that I've been thrown out by the Americans because I was taking the Americans on and maybe appeal to some of the nationalists base within her country. Is there an apprehension that Bangladesh can go down a path where indian militant groups, insurgent groups, start again forming this? Yes, that is a distinct possibility, and.

Possible Threats from Bangladesh's Political Changes

But that possibility exists because you have chosen a person, you chose to work with a person for last 15 years, 20 years, and that person became extremely unpopular, despotic, authoritarian, and has been thrown out. But if somebody else comes into power today, they may want to kind of punish you or trouble you or may not be willing to go the. Go the whole hog to stop these kind of, you know, forces, these kind of groups from.

Bangladesh's Identity and Regional Stability

From gaining basis. Will it become another Pakistan? I don't think that's possible. The fact that in 1971 it went away, it took a very different route based on the basis of its, you know, ethnic linguistic identity rather than a religious identity. I don't think it is going to become another Pakistan or it is going to be a three front challenge, as many people would like to, you know, and many people have been talking about.

India and Bangladesh's Future Relations

I think that's a. That's. That's a bit over. That's a bit overblown Bangladeshi. Bangladesh has a huge amount of affinity with India. And despite all these troubles, I think over a period of time, in the next three, four, five years, things are going to come back to a bit more normal because Bangladesh has borders only with India and a very small border with Myanmar.

Rohingya Crisis and India's Role

It doesn't have border with any other country. India is the only country it knows and it wants to work with India. It would be absolutely stupid on the part of Dhaka to think that it can live without India. No, nobody in Dhaka has said that we will. We can live without India. Nobody is going to say that. They are also realistic people.

Long-term Solutions and Trust Building

So people, these kind of trust building exercises, these kind of exercises through which you can talk to people, engage them and arrive at some solutions and give some time, you know, for these tempers to come down, for these emotions to come down, that possibility, that is possibly the way it will have to go to my mind. Right.

Bangladesh's Policies Regarding Rohingya Refugees

I have two questions. One is from a. One is from one of our listeners who's asking, what do you think that the. This is from Roshan who is asking, what do you think the policy, Bangladesh's policies towards Rohingya refugees will be? And how will that impact India? And another question which I think seems like a good sort of a question to end perhaps, is what do you think it will take to make the forces free from the Hindutva ideology of our ruling government?

Interim Government's Response to Rohingya Issue

Of course, let's do the Bangladesh one first and we can come to. And I really think it would be great to sort of touch upon the upcoming elections before we close the conversations. But what do you think? What do you think will be the change in the way that the Rohingya crisis is being dealt with and how that might affect India's side of it as well?

Uncertainty About Rohingya Policy

So, so far, the interim government has not spoken. Has spoken about the Rohingya crisis in any way as to how. What they're going to do with the Rohingyas. You know, to be fair to Sheikh Hasina, and I'm not a great fan of. For the kind of authoritarian rule that she imposed upon Bangladesh. She was very good on the Rohingya issue.

Support Provided to Rohingya Crisis

She did provide the kind of support and made a lot of efforts to deal with the Rohingya issue. You know, international civil society organizations tell me that she was willing to work on the Rohingya issue. And if they had meetings with her, the only instructions were that you will not talk about democracy in Bangladesh or human rights in Bangladesh.

International Attention and Support

Talk about Rohingyas, work for the Rohingyas and get out. Don't do anything beyond that. My own sense is that the kind of interim government that is taking place in Bangladesh, especially with the Nobel laureate leading the interim government as the chief advisor, it is highly unlikely that they would immediately change the position.

International Relations and Rohingya Refugees

They need the support of the United States and other western countries, and he is personally very popular with these western countries. So it is highly unlikely that it would happened. And Rohingyas being Muslims, you know, I don't think even the Jamaatis or BNP's would say that these Muslims need to be. Need to be. Need to be thrown out.

Challenges with the Rohingya Refugee Crisis

Of course, Rohingya challenge is a very complex challenge. These are poor countries. You know, where do these people go? Do you really put them on an island like the way Bangladesh has now put them? What happens to the Rohingyas who want to come to India? Should India not be a signatory to the UNHCR and, you know, not India not be allowing these refugees to come and take its share of the load?

India's Role in Rohingya Refugee Solutions

Should India not be pushing Myanmar to take these people back and give them their. Give them their citizenship rights and so on and so forth? These are very complex questions. I don't think any one of us, at least of it, me, can predict as to which way it is going to go. But in the immediate term, in the next six to eight months, one year, I don't see any change in policy coming from.

Future Uncertainties

Coming from. Coming from Bangladesh. Sushant, could we. We are really running over time, I think, because we had, and we are getting quite a few questions. So my apologies to the listeners whose questions we may not be able to take.

Changes in International Relations

But one last thing, perhaps to discuss is the looming sort of change in the international space, which is the elections in the United States of America that are happening later in the year. Do you think that a change from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris, does it mean anything for India? But more importantly, a change from Joe Biden to Donald Trump, what will that mean for India? What will that mean for our neighborhood here in South Asia?

Unpredictability of Trump Administration

I think with Trump, you can't predict. None of us can predict what Trump says tomorrow and what he does tomorrow and what he says today and does tomorrow. So it's very hard to predict. But when Trump was earlier, the president, I think Mister Modi, had a very good relationship with him and the organization.

Possible Change in Relationships Based on Leadership

These Trump rallies in Gujarat, in the Narendra Modi stadium, whatever that Trump, and they did another rally in Ustan with him, I think so. You know, so India has had good ties with Trump. But the larger point is starting with Bill Clinton in the late 1990s, once the United States establishment decided that they're going to bet on India, irrespective of the party in power and irrespective of the president in power, they have gone whole hog behind India.

Continuity in US Policy Towards India

And it is unlikely that President Kamala Harris or President Trump are going to change that policy. The reasons can be from being acting as a counterweight to China, to being this next big economy, to whatever those reasons may be, the idea is now deeply embedded in the establishment that they need to.

Steadiness of India-US Relations

That India is a country they want on their side rather than on the other side. And this has been the idea, irrespective of whichever party has been in power. Unless India does really something really stupid or really something crazy or really something obnoxious, it is unlikely that policy will change.

Potential Pitfalls for India

Variations can be there. Mister Modi goes and hugs Putin. Clearly, this is not going to be like in DC. This is going to embarrass the DC. If you go and try. What. What is the alleged killing of someone in New York? That something is not going to go down?

Concluding Thoughts on International Relations

Well, they're going to the people who, you know, who are opposed to having closer ties with India, they will get emboldened. But if we do something even more stupid, even something more crazier, then clearly, you know, there will be consequences. But if you play it smartly and if we play it normally the way.

Maintaining Positive Relations

The way, you know, the way governments do it, then. Then I don't see. Then I don't see. Then I don't see any problem. But if we decide to go to. Into Pakistan, you know, in Pok, and say we are going to take back Pok, as many ministers were saying, then all bets are off, then I don't know what's going to happen after that, if you're going to do something like that.

The Need for Caution in Policy Decisions

So really, it depends. If we don't do any. If we don't do anything stupid, I think our ties with the United States, irrespective of the party in power, are going to be pretty fine. Okay. Amazing.

Final Thanks and Acknowledgements

Thank you, Sushant. I think we are quite a bit over time. So I'm going to apologize to a few of the questions that were really good ones, actually. But perhaps good things for us to consider for our next spaces about making our military Hindutva free, or perhaps even thinking about when it comes to stupid things being done.

Looking Ahead to Future Discussions

Perhaps talking a little bit about what has happened on the Khalistan issue in the international space. But perhaps that's for another time, because we are really short on. Thanks, Sushant. Thank you so much for talking to me. And also thank you to all our listeners for joining.

Acknowledging Audience and Support for Media

We've had quite a good number. Thank you so much for all of you for tuning in. I just want to remind everyone that, please, Sushant, writes a column for caravan, as you know, and please subscribe and support independent media like the caravan.

Encouraging Subscription and Participation

And of course, you will be able to get access to all his writing as well, which I think is reason enough. So reminder to everyone to do that. And, of course, to also say that we are having a sale, an Independence day sale for independent media.

Closing Remarks on Upcoming Conversations

So please support the caravan and subscribe to us. And thank you so much for joining these spaces. And we'll be back soon with more conversation, definitely with sushant and, of course, with a lot of other people who write with us, who work with us.

Appreciating Engagement and Participation

So looking forward to having this audience back again. Again, thanks a lot, everyone. Thank you, Sushant. Thank you. Surabhi. Thanks, everyone. Thank you. It was wonderful talking to you. Thanks a lot. Bye bye.