History of Ilorin and her Scholars.

Space Summary

The Twitter Space History of Ilorin and her Scholars. hosted by InsideIlorin_NG. The Twitter Space delved into the rich history of Ilorin, shining a light on its exceptional scholars and their enduring impact on various domains. Through discussions on intellectual exchange, cultural development, and regional influence, the session provided valuable insights into Ilorin's heritage and its significance in shaping narratives and preserving cultural legacies.

For more spaces, visit the Alpha Group page.

Space Statistics

For more stats visit the full Live report

Questions

Q: What makes Ilorin a significant location for scholars?
A: Ilorin's history is rich with renowned intellectuals who have made lasting impacts in various fields.

Q: How does Ilorin's scholarly heritage contribute to community growth?
A: The scholarly heritage of Ilorin fosters intellectual exchange, innovation, and cultural development.

Q: In what ways have Ilorin scholars influenced broader regions?
A: Ilorin scholars have transcended local boundaries, impacting neighboring regions and beyond.

Q: Why is understanding Ilorin's history crucial for societal dynamics?
A: Insights into Ilorin's past help in understanding the city's current social fabric and cultural identity.

Highlights

Time: 00:15:42
Legacy of Ilorin Scholars Exploring the profound legacy left by Ilorin's esteemed scholars across generations.

Time: 00:25:20
Intellectual and Cultural Exchange in Ilorin Discussing how Ilorin serves as a focal point for intellectual and cultural interactions.

Time: 00:35:10
Influential Figures from Ilorin Highlighting key figures from Ilorin whose contributions have transcended local boundaries.

Key Takeaways

• Ilorin has a deep-rooted history with remarkable scholars known for their contributions to various fields.
• The city serves as a hub of intellectual and cultural exchange, fostering growth and innovation.
• Understanding the historical context of Ilorin provides insights into its current societal dynamics and identity.
• Scholars from Ilorin have significantly influenced not only the local community but also broader regions.
• The heritage of Ilorin's scholars plays a vital role in shaping narratives and preserving cultural legacies.

Behind the Mic

Introduction

Hello everyone, this is Anas Alhaji. We will start in 1 minute. Thank you.

Addressing Doctor Heikel

Doctor Heikel. I've sent you speaking invitation a couple of times. I don't know if there is any problem or technical problems. Thank you. Doctor Haeckel, do you hear me? Well? I do. Yes, I hear you. Thank you very much. Okay, excellent. Thank you.

Context of Events

Thank you everyone for joining us today. As you know, these are major events in the Middle East after the Israeli attacks on Lebanon and the killing of the head of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. As you all know, you heard Doctor Heikel before. You know who he is. He is a professor of Near East studies at Princeton University. He is well known expert on the Middle East. He is writing a book right now. He's olive and he's writing a book on the future of Saudi Arabia, on the vision 2030 and MBS, etcetera. So he's well versed with these issues, well versed with all the issues related to political Islam, all the Islamic movements in the region.

Doctor Heikel's Background

He's written a book on that and we are lucky to have him today, given the current. Given the current event. Today's space, like the previous spaces, is sponsored by Ataka. Ataka is the only platform in Arabic that covers energy, focuses on energy. And just to give you the significance of that, it has more readers than most of the media outlets in the Middle East. At the same time, during the power outages in Lebanon just over a month ago, the only interview, basically, that's been given in details by the ministry or by the minister of energy in Lebanon was given to Ataka.

Ataka's Coverage and Role

And when the minister wrote an article trying to explain what happened and what they are doing, he chose Ataka exclusively to publish his article. So the connection is not only through what we are going to talk about today. Ataka is also connected to Lebanon through the coverage of the energy crisis and various energy issues, and the publishing of the interview and the article by the Lebanese energy minister today. We have a lot of things to cover and many things to talk about. And we are going to mix politics with economics, we are going to mix politics with energy.

Commencement of Discussion with Doctor Haykel

Doctor Haykel, thank you very much for accepting our invitation today. And a lot of people basically are waiting to hear from you. As you know, we are going to talk about Lebanon and the possibility that the war or the attacks might expand to other areas. And probably we are witnessing a new Middle East, probably a change in the Middle East. And that has consequences, including implications for the global energy industries. And I said industries with an 's' at the end, because we are talking about oil and gas and everything else, and we will discuss this toward the end.

Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah

Everyone is familiar with Hezbollah. Everyone is familiar with the name of Hassan Nasrallah. Everyone is familiar with the fighting on the border between Lebanon and Israel. But very few people know the history of Hezbollah. How it started, what its objectives are and what they wanted, and how Hassan Nasrallah ascended to power. Thank you. Thank you very much, Doctor Anas, would you like me to begin by talking about the history of Hezbollah? Please. Okay. Okay.

The History of Hezbollah

So, first, let me just say it's a real pleasure to be back in this space. And I will be speaking as an academic. I know that there are a lot of emotions that are running very high, always with Middle Eastern politics. But I'll try to be as dispassionate as possible. I'll also say that I'm primarily an expert on the Arabian Peninsula and less on Lebanon. But I have followed the history of Hezbollah quite closely. And I teach a course on political Islam that touches on Hezbollah's history and its relationship to Iran over two, three weeks of the semester at Princeton.

Creation of Hezbollah

So Hezbollah was created and was established right after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 1982. It was created by the Islamic Republic of Iran, specifically by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is a special division separate from the Iranian army that was created after the revolution to protect and defend the revolution. It has operations. This is the IRGC, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. It has operations both within Iran and overseas. Within Iran. It's not just a military organization, but it's also deeply involved in the business and economy of Iran.

Role of IRGC

It owns many businesses. So you can think about it almost like you would think about the Egyptian army and its relationship to domestic economics and economic activity and economic sectors in Egypt. But it also has this foreign overseas component, which is that it is aiming to defend the regime in Iran from external enemies. And those enemies are principally, on the one hand, great Satan, that is the United States, and little Satan, that is Israel. So the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps operates throughout the Middle East and throughout the world in trying to protect the regime from the people or the entities or the countries that they regard as their enemies.

Conflict with Israel

Israel being a very important one. And so they created Hezbollah in Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli invasion. And it was a way of organizing the Shia community in Lebanon, which was already being organized before Hezbollah's arrival and rise by Shia cleric who disagreed with the Iranian revolutionary ideology. A man called Saeed Musa Sadr, who disappeared very mysteriously in 1978 in Libya. And the late dictator of Libya, Muhammad al Qaddafi is accused of having played a role in his killing. In any case, Hezbollah was created by Iran, and it was created largely as a force that would help create a deterrence against a direct attack on the Iranian homeland on the mainland of Iran.

Hezbollah's Evolution

And so Hezbollah is, over time, it became a much more professional force. It started attacking Israel, which was occupying Lebanon. Ultimately, this culminated in the expulsion of Israel from Lebanon in the year 2000, largely because of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces and their Lebanese allies in South Lebanon. And it became more and more professional. It entered into Lebanese civil life. Hezbollah runs social services. It runs hospitals. It has a charitable side.

Political Role of Hezbollah

It also, after the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, there was a debate as to whether Hezbollah would become a Lebanese political party. In addition to being a militia, it did become a Lebanese political party. So it fielded candidates in parliament for elections. And of all the Lebanese factions of the civil war, it's the only one that kept its militia in the name of defending Lebanon against Israel. So it's unique in that sense in Lebanese society. And it mobilized and organized the Shiite community in Lebanon extremely effectively and eventually became the most powerful single political force and military force in Lebanon, so that all politics in Lebanon needed the approval of Hezbollah's activity and its decision-making process.

Hezbollah's Theological Connection

Theologically, Hezbollah is deeply connected to the Iranian revolution. And they consider the supreme leader in Iran to be the. To be their leader. I mean, they regard him as the leader and the supreme leader in Iran. The Rahbar in Persian or the Wali al faqih in Arabic is someone whom they consider to be both a political and religious leader simultaneously. And when he gives an order, they obey it. You cannot be a member of Hezbollah's fighting force unless you believe in the doctrine of, which is the founding doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Funding and Support

And so they have an organic link to Iran. Iran funds and arms them, and they can be seen as a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard corps in Lebanon. They've, since 2000, played a very active role in Lebanese politics, including being involved in the assassination of a number of Lebanese critics and people who were against them, including the prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, the former prime minister, whom they assassinated in 2005.

Involvement in Syrian Conflict

They also, then after the Syrian revolution and the Arab Spring, got involved in the Syrian civil war and sent many thousands of troops that were ostensibly meant to defend Lebanon from Israel into Syria. And there they were involved in defending the regime of Bashar al Assad. And they were involved in the committing of many massacres in Syria primarily against Sunni Muslim Syrians, which is why you see the Sunni Muslims in Syria today quite happy at the death of Hassan Nasrallah and he himself.

Hassan Nasrallah's Ascension

Hassan Nasrallah came to power as leader or the secretary general of the movement after a preceding secretary general was killed by the Israelis in a helicopter gunship attack, I believe it was in 1992. And he rose up from a fairly poor background, but one that in which he was quite religious. He did study briefly, I think, in Iraq and was involved in Shia religious politics from an early age. He became the leader after the killing of Abbas Musawi, predecessor, and he was a very charismatic, very eloquent speaker and organizer and mobilizer of the Shias of Lebanon.

Future of Hezbollah

Anyway, I think I'm going on and on, but I can give you a lot more detail about him. Effectively, his killing by Israel spells a major event in Lebanese politics and in the history of this movement. There's a big question mark now as to whether the movement can survive him. Clearly, the Israelis have been able within a matter of weeks to kill virtually the entire military leadership of this movement, as well as many of its cadres, and with the pager attacks and the radio attacks as well.

Questions on Hezbollah's Identity

So it's not clear what the future of this movement will be now that so many of them have been killed. I'll answer, and I'm happy to take more questions. Professor Heikel, you mentioned that it is a political movement and it is at the same time a religious movement. Yes. Is there kind of a defining line between the two or the overlap or they overlap like a hundred percent or religion being taken as a tool here?

Religion and Politics in Hezbollah

Or, I mean, what did the relationship between politics and religion in Hezbollah? So initially, when, after it was created in the early eighties, Hezbollah openly said that they are a religious movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon that would be part of the greater Islamic state led by Iran. And you can find this on YouTube. You can find clips of Hassan Nasrallah as a young man saying very explicitly that his project was a pan Islamic state, a caliphate, if you like, under the leadership of the supreme leader of Iran, then Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hezbollah's Ideological Roots

He died in 1988, and then 88, 89, and then he was succeeded by Ayatollah Khamenei, who was the present supreme leader of Iran. I don't think there's a very strong, ultimately, there's a very strong distinction between religion and politics in this movement because, as I alluded earlier, you cannot be a fighter in Hezbollah if you don't believe in theology of the Islamic Republic of Iran, you have to be first indoctrinated in theology of Walait al Faqi, the guardianship of the jurist doctrine, which is Khomeini's key ideological contribution to Shia political thought.

Concealment of Religious Agenda

And only then will you receive military training and be allowed to fight among the ranks of Hezbollah. So they've always maintained a religious project. They've concealed that religious project, especially after they joined the Lebanese parliament in 1992, where they claimed that they were Lebanese. And a number of academics who are apologists for this movement have said that they are really a Lebanese political movement. I have never seen them to be a Lebanese political movement.

Hezbollah's Advocacy for Iran

I've seen them as a branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that was created and that exists solely for the defense of Iran and for the defense of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which is a religious commitment that they have. Thank you. Many people. I mean, once you get out of Lebanon and you go throughout the Arab world, many people believe that Hezbollah did not do much for the Gazans in Gaza and whatever firing was, they talk about, like just one post and one farm and chicken and all this stuff, how serious they were in their behavior regarding really trying to help the Gazans.

Technical Difficulties

Doctor Haykel. Okay, it seems that Doctor Haykel has a technical problem because he's no longer in the space. Probably. He'll come back in a minute, please. Muhammad from Cairo, from Ataka. Please follow up with him, if you can. While we are waiting for Doctor Haykel, I just would like to offer some updates, and I will talk about some energy issues.

Updates on the Situation

Syrians within Syria, especially in northwest Syria, where it's a completely kind of no man's land. And in Europe, we're celebrating since yesterday. Even shop owners basically opened their shops just to give free stuff to people because they were very happy. One of the reasons why, because Hezbollah fighters literally committed war crimes in Syria. I mean, the level of destruction was massive. And if you look at the pictures that's been there, I think Doctor Haykel is back.

Rejoining the Discussion

I am. I'm sorry. For some reason, my Internet froze. All right, go ahead, please. I'm sorry, I didn't hear your question. I did not hear you. But can you repeat the question? The. Okay, let me rephrase that. Many people in the Arab world, once you get out of the area that is controlled by Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, they seriously think that Hezbollah did not do much for Gaza, although it kept claiming they are trying to defend the Gazans against the Israelis.

Strategic Relationships

Yes. So it's not clear what promises Hezbollah and Iran gave to Hamas in Gaza. I mean, clearly the Iranians and Hezbollah were involved in the training and arming of and funding of Hamas. It's possible that the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Senwar, thought that the Hezbollah would open a full front and all out war against Israel after October 7 of last year. That did not happen.

Hezbollah's Controlled Response

Hezbollah started firing rockets, but in a very controlled and measured way against Israel on October 8 of last year. And I, the Iranians did attack Israel, but that was only really in response to an attack against Iranian Iran Revolution Guard corps commanders and officers in Syria in a building next to the embassy in Damascus. The Iranian embassy in Damascus. So I think Hamas, if it was given the promise that Hezbollah would join the fully in the war, would have been disappointed by the fact that Hezbollah did not do so.

Iran's Focus on Its Regime

I think ultimately, one has to think of Hezbollah and of Iran as being first and foremost interested in the preservation and protection of the revolution and the government, the regime in Tehran. That is the first order of priority for this movement and for, of course, the Iran regime itself. It's only. And the involvement of this movement of Hezbollah and of Iran in the Palestinian cause. If you go back to Ayatollah Khomeini's writings, Ayatollah Khomeini, again, the leader of the Iran revolution in 1979, and a very important figure for the establishment of the ideology upon which the Iranian revolution and the Iranian state are founded.

Khomeini's Ideological Framework

If you look at his writings, he always insisted from at least the early 1960s that the Palestinian issue was a very important issue because it was one way for Iran, which is a Shiite Muslim state or Shiite Muslim population later, now Shiite Muslim state, to bridge the divide between Sunnis and Shias, because Sunnis regard twelve or Shias to be heretics. So one way to bridge that divide and to overcome that sectarian divide is for Iran to support the Palestinian cause. And I think that's been a consistent line from Khomeini all the way through until today.

The Relationship Between Palestinian Issue and Iran

So in other words, the way to look at this relationship between the palestinian issue and Iran should be also the sectarian dimension of the politics of the Middle east. Over to you.

Hamas's Control Over Gaza

I want to pass this idea by you, which is that Hamas basically does not want to lose control of Gaza, and therefore they've been hiding in those tunnels and they don't want to go for a full fight with Israel because they know this war is going to end up one day, and then they need to control Gaza again. So if they go for a fight, they lose and they lose Gaza. Hezbollah, basically, if they go for a full war or for reaction to Israel, then they will be destroyed and then they cannot rule Lebanon the same way they do it. So they want to stay in bankers, basically until the war is over. So they keep control of Lebanon. And for Iran, they will not go for a full fight until they have the nuclear bomb, and then it will be a deterrence and no one can mess with them.

Netanyahu's Political Ambitions

So then Netanyahu or whoever behind him, because it seems, based on what we've seen now, it seems that many governments are happy that he killed Nasrallah, regardless whether the killer israel or not. Even arab governments basically are happy with this. So it seems that they realized that to end their control of Lebanon, they have to attack them at home. To end the attack on. Sorry, who's the subject here? The idea is that the attack, the israeli attack basically is really because Hezbollah wants to stay in control of Lebanon. So the end of war in Gaza is not going to end their dominance. And by attacking them at home, basically they can end their dominance in Lebanon.

Israel's Long-term Strategy Against Iran

Yes. Yeah. So I think that the, well, I think there are several issues that are going on here, and they're all entangled with each other. First, the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, wants to salvage his power and his reputation and his legacy. So he's motivated to destroy Hezbollah if he can. And the Israelis have been preparing for a war with Hezbollah since the last war in 2006. So the Israelis have been at this preparation for 18 years. And you can see the results of this careful preparation in the incredible success that the Israelis have had at penetrating Hezbollah, just killing the top leadership, et cetera. So I think Netanyahu's own ambitions are to be factored in.

Destructive Aims Against Iranian Influence

I think also Israel has decided, and this is both across the entire political spectrum of Israel's leadership, that the regime in Iran has to be brought down, that the regime in Iran has to be toppled. And so now it's part of Israel's, you know, long term strategy to change the regime in Iran. You do that by, if you can, by destroying the proxy non state actors who operate in conjunction with or sometimes directly under the control of the iranian regime. The most important of the iranian proxies is Hezbollah. So if you can take out Hezbollah completely, you've really damaged Iran significantly. Also, you have enabled yourself to attack Iran directly because the line, because Hezbollah, as a force of deterrence against an attack on the iranian mainland, will be gone.

Potential Israeli Attacks and Global Implications

And so Israel now, if it manages to destroy Hezbollah militarily, not politically, but militarily means that it can attack Iran without fear of 150,000 missiles raiding on Israel from Lebanon. So I think this is part of a bigger strategy by Israel to contain Iran, maybe even toppled a regime in Iran. And it's beginning with Hezbollah. I think the next attacks will be in Yemen against the houthi movement, which is a much weaker and much less organized movement that also has been firing missiles at Israel, including one today that was intercepted. And then maybe the shia militias in Iraq will be a third target. But ultimately with the aim of changing the regime in Iran, and I think the Israelis would like the United States to join in that effort militarily, because with the Americans on their side, they're likely to prevail in damaging the iranian regime.

Hezbollah's Relationship with Gulf States

Before I go to the next expected phases, will you please enlighten us on the relationship between Hezbollah and the Gulf states with specifics basically related to Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain? Oh, I mean, the relationship is an extremely bad relationship, but, you know, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. It's official policy in these countries that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. If any Hezbollah member is found in those countries, they are immediately arrested and put in prison. So there's a lot of enmity between these countries and Hezbollah and an enmity that has only increased recently because Hezbollah has played a very important role, the training and arming of the houthi militia in Yemen.

Regional Tensions and Economic Consequences

So, you know, as far as a country like Saudi Arabia or a country like the UAE is concerned, they have lost soldiers and they've lost, you know, they've been attacked by the Houthis with the help and guidance and training of Hezbollah. So there's absolutely zero love loss there. And I'm sure in the Gulf countries there's extreme happiness and excitement at the destruction of Hezbollah, or at least the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon. I don't think they will openly express this in public, but I think it's very clear that they regard Hezbollah as an arm of the iranian regime, as an extremely aggressive, forward leaning tool in the arsenal of Iran, and they will be delighted to see this movement weakened, if not defeated again.

Hezbollah's Involvement in Drug Trade

Before we move to those future phases, just kind of a side question on Hezbollah and the drug trade and the syrian keptagon trade in the gulf and other places, which is probably another reason why those countries are against it, too. Yeah, absolutely. That's just one additional reason. Absolutely. I mean, the syrian regime is involved in the captagon trade and production and trade and drug trade into Arabia, and for sure Hezbollah is involved in that. And that would be an additional reason. But I think the main reason is that Hezbollah represents a security and military threat to the regimes in the gulf.

Future Israeli Military Operations

You mentioned the phases earlier, and will you see these attacks once they are done? Now, since the leadership of Hezbollah is gone and probably Hezbollah is in disarray right now, will the Israelis go after the militias in Iraq and Yemen, especially now they are being attacked by them? I definitely think that the militias in Yemen, the militia in Yemen, that is the Houthis, will be a target of attack. And I would not be surprised if the Israelis will try to decapitate that movement by killing the leader and his members of his family. This is the Houthi family, and the leader's name is Abdul Malik. As far as Iraq is concerned, that's less of an immediate threat to Israel. But I think there might be also there an attempt to get at some of the militia leaders there, though in Iraq it becomes more complicated also, because you have american troops and american bases in Iraq.

U.S. Military Presence and Cooperation

So Americans would be, american troops would be vulnerable to an attack by these militias. They often are attacked by these militias. But there, I think in Iraq, there would be much more coordination with the Americans than, say, in Lebanon, where I don't think the Americans were involved in this recent set of attacks. Correct me if I am wrong on this, the militia that is trying to attack Israel, isn't it the same militia that's been supported by the United States to fight ISIS? Well, yes, the United States made a pact with the devil when they were fighting ISIS in that they worked with militias of what is called the hashtag, popular mobilization, militias that are in close alliance with iranian, many of which are in close alliance with the regime in Iran.

Strategic Israeli Actions Against Iranian Regime

So, yes, when it came to the war against ISIS, the United States was collaborating quite closely, even with the IRGC, even with the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, including Qassim Suleimani, who was later killed by the United States. But yes. Now, basically it is based on what you said and based on what we see, if Israel is successful basically in disarming Hamas, and now if they can disarm whatever left from Hezbollah, then they can attack Iran freely because there is no one to launch rockets or other things at Israel.

Potential Reshaping of the Middle East

And probably they will attack the militia in Iraq and attack the militia in Yemen. It seems that in a sense, Israel, on behalf of everyone else, is reshaping the Middle east for something else. And probably this is the core of today's space. So do you see that the crackdown on those militias by the Israelis and the crackdown on the various islamic elements in various countries, etcetera, kind of the reshape of the new Middle east based on new vision? Well, there are multiple visions in the Middle East.

Israeli Vision for the Middle East

I mean, certainly the Israelis are trying to reshape the Middle east in their image, in what they want to do. Whether they're going to be successful or not is still an open question. I think the jury is still out on this. I hear you. Yeah. Okay, good. Yeah. So I think that, as I said, I think the Israelis are trying. I think their attacks, they will definitely attack the Houthis. Now, it's possible that they will attack the Iranians as well, but only if the Iranians decide to quickly build a nuclear weapon, which they can do very quickly if Iran wants to do that.

Risk of Escalation with Iran

So I think there is high risk of an escalation with Iran, especially if Iran decides to go for the weapon. So that's a worrying sign. And I think the Iranians don't want a war with Israel because I think if you were the ayatollah in Iran, say Ayatollah Khamenei, and you're watching what's been happening over the last few months. First, what you see is that the Israelis are able to mobilize very large american forces into the region. As we know, there are two aircraft carrier strike groups in the region. There are more us troops in the region because of after October 7 attack.

Iran's Leadership Concerns

So you have a much larger us military presence in the region. That's one, two. You see that Israel is able to not only defeat Hamas militarily, not politically, but also Hezbollah. Now, it's also able to block a very major attack that happened in April, I believe, where Iran sent over 300 missiles and drones at Israel, most of which were intercepted. You also, if you're the Ayatollah, you see that the president of Iran and the foreign minister of Iran died in a mysterious helicopter crash that may or may not have been involved the Israelis. But if you're suspicious and conspiratorial, which I think the Ayatollah in Iran is, you will suspect that the Israelis did that.

Israeli Penetration into Iran's Security Forces

So if they can do that, then they can probably do other things and only to prove how powerful the Israelis are at having completely penetrated the iranian regime and its security forces, the Israelis were able to kill Ismail Haniyyah, who was the leader of Hamas, the political leader of Hamas, in a safe house, in an IRGC safe house in the middle of Tehran. So if you're Iran, you would be very worried that the Israelis can do tremendous damage to your country and to the leadership of your country. And so I think the Iranians don't want the war, but the Israelis are now in a phase of escalation with the idea of, yes, remaking the Middle east.

Differences in Regional Visions

Now, do the Israelis, I mean, specifically, does Prime Minister Netanyahu want to remake the Middle east in the image or in the vision that, say, a country like Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates has for the region? I'm not sure, because if you look at the saudi vision or if you look at the Emirati vision, basically it's a vision. I don't hear you, Professor Haykel.

Technical Difficulties in Communication

I don't know if you hear me. Seem there is a problem. Professor Heikel, do you hear me? Okay, Mohammed, do you hear, Professor Haikil? Okay. It seems he has a technical problem. He left the space again. My next question to him basically was regarding the. Okay, let me see if we can bring him back here.

Saudi and Emirati Regional Vision

And just an expansion of the. What are the saudi and Amarati visions for the region and how it differs from others from the Iranians and the Israelis. Anyway, the whole idea here is, and this is the energy part that I want to talk about until Professor Haykel comes back, that if Iran's influence in the region is cut back, so we have very dormant Hezbollah, Lebanon, with little impact. The militia. And Iraq basically is non existent. The militia, the Houthis in Yemen are completely destroyed, and the Iranians basically are confined to their country.

Geopolitical Implications of Changes in the Region

What would happen in the region? And one thing is clear, just to tell you, to show you the significance of what's been going on in the last 30, 35 years in the region, just in the Levant alone. So we are talking about Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Over 40 million people left. 40 million people. Most of those people right now are in the west, in Europe and the United States. Most of them are well established, whether in terms of businesses or in terms of careers, etcetera. Many of them would love to come back.

Effects of Economic Growth on Regional Stability

Many of them would like to go back and invest. So there is a large diaspora from the region that can come back if this, those militias basically are stopped and a couple of regimes basically are changed, like the syrian regime. So you are going to see tremendous economic growth in the region, in Iraq, in Syria, Lebanon, in Yemen. At the same time, you are going to see a major increase in energy production in general, and you are going to see an increase in oil and gas production going back to Lebanon.

Potential for Resource Extraction in Lebanon

By the way, one of the conspiracy theories being circulated was southern Lebanon has a gas field that's called Khana, and total basically was supposed to operate that field. And all of a sudden they came back last year and they said, well, it's dry, but only a couple of miles away there is Karish field, the israeli field, and it has a lot of gas. So what people are saying, that this grand invasion of Israel to southern Lebanon is not only to clear the area and make kind of a buffer zone, but basically it will drive out Hezbollah away from the area.

Economic Treaties and Agreements

So the lebanese government basically, and the companies can literally let the gas companies invest in the area based on the contract they have. Basically, Israel will get 17% of the lebanese gas no matter what. That's part of the agreement, although the whole area is in Lebanon, within Lebanon's water. But they will get it. Again, this is a conspiracy theory being circulating, but it has some, in a sense, there is no fire without smoke, so it has some legs. But generally speaking, we will see massive economic growth in the region.

Impact on Energy Market Dynamics

We will see massive energy production. We will see increase in oil and gas supplies. You would think this is bearish. No, it's not. And the reason why, because all the increases that we are looking at is barely enough to meet the energy demand that's coming from that growth. For example, historically, Yemen was an oil exporter. Yemen was an Lng exporter. But if you look at the population of Yemen, you look at Yemen, it came back to be kind of almost like a virgin country, just very primitive because of the war and everything else.

Need for Infrastructure Development

It needs a lot of infrastructure, etcetera. So the oil in it and the gas in it is barely enough for domestic consumption, which means that it cannot export either. If you look at Iraq, the potential for Iraq, just the growth in Iraq, would literally reduce Iraq's export of oil. They need a lot of gas. They cannot export the gas. So the idea here is if Iran is contained and the area experiences this high economic growth, their energy production will increase. But again, that's not bearish because their energy demand is going to be way higher, and the net result is bullish.

Growth Prospects Amid Regional Tensions

Professor Haykel is back with us. So back to you, Professor Haykel. Yeah, I really apologize again. And I've switched now to chrome, so hopefully it's better than safari, and it won't, keeps freezing up. And I don't know what the last words I said that you could hear. Well, let's. Let me start with the question. Start fresh, basically.

Economic Workings After Military Actions

Okay. And now, the, during your absence, basically, I was just talking about a scenario where Iran is limited and all its militias basically are contained and that leads to economic growth and therefore the energy demand, etcetera, probably. You heard that last part. Yes. But to go back to the Middle east, and you mentioned the visions. So what is the difference exactly? Kind of outlined the difference between the Saudi Emirati vision versus the iranian vision versus the israeli vision.

Visions of Regional Power Dynamics

Okay. I think that there are very different visions. So the iranian vision is that of a reactionary, revisionist power.

Iranian Vision and Ideology

So let's call it vision 1979. So the Iranian vision is basically, the region is under the control and domination of western imperial and colonial powers, namely the United States, and that the region can never be prosperous and free unless you defeat the United States and you expel the United States from the region and you destroy its local manifestation, which is the state of Israel. So that's the. And all the problems of the region are because of foreigners, essentially. So it's a politics in an ideology based on resentment, based on blaming others for your present situation.

Vision of Saudi Arabia and UAE

The vision of Saudi Arabia and the UAE is quite different. It doesn't look at the past, it doesn't care about imperialism, doesn't care about a history of exploitation. It doesn't deny that the region was exploited by western powers. But it wants to look towards the future and say that we need to build our economy, we need to diversify, develop our economy, diversify our economy. We need to educate our population because the energy transition is happening and we need to be prepared for the future, not look at the past. That's essentially the vision of the Gulf states.

Israeli Vision and Palestinian Issue

And the Israeli vision is it shares that economic development and technological innovation and those aspects with the Gulf states. But the Israeli vision under the present government is to deny the Palestinians a state, a viable state. And the Gulf countries say, as long as the Palestinian issue is not resolved justly, the revisionists, the Iranians, the people who basically want to change the political and power dynamics in the region, will always use the Palestinian issue to create instability, to generate wars like we see in Gaza and Lebanon, in Iraq and so on. And so the Israeli government, again, as it's presently constituted, doesn't want to resolve this Palestinian issue. And so, in a way, the right-wing government of Israel that wants to deny the Palestinians a state is helping the Iranians and helping the people who want to see radical politics that prevail in the region and the Gulf states want a different kind of politics.

Differences in Political Aspirations

They're not radical. They're not revolutionary. They're for stability. They're for development. They're authoritarian, certainly, but they are interested in the future and not in the past. And so there are differences between the Israelis and the Gulf countries, mainly over Palestine. And there are huge differences between Iran and their vision, 1979 versus, say, vision 2030 or 2040 in the Gulf.

Israeli Attitude Towards the Peace Process

I got a written question from a colleague. He said, after all the successes of the Israelis in Lebanon and Gaza, isn't there kind of an attitude problem here where they just, they don't, I mean, when people talk about the peace process in the region, that they have the upper hand now and they think they have the upper hand, and therefore the conditions will be harder than before even to achieve any agreement. Yeah, I think that's right. I think it will be harder to convince the Israelis to reach an agreement on the Palestinian issue. But I think there are Israelis, not many, unfortunately, but there are Israelis who understand that as long as you don't resolve the Palestinian issue, and there are many ways of thinking about what a resolution can look like, you will have extremists and you will have radicals in the region who will want to resort to violence and to destabilize the region.

Consequences of Palestinian Issue

And so I do think that the, I think the feat of Hezbollah, if that's really what happened, is not as important as the question of the Palestinians. The question of Palestinians should be addressed by the Israelis calmly, maybe when they're less traumatized. And they should realize that unless they give the Palestinians a state, they will always have countries like Iran that will try to destabilize and try to create a very hostile environment for them in the Middle East. And that's just a fact.

Technology and Its Implications

Final question related to technology. After what we've seen in recent weeks, what it is very clear now for all the organizations and for various leaders in the Middle East, even the most peaceful, just to stay away from technology. And for the organizations that governments fear the most from within, basically, they just go technology less in this case, and they go under, and therefore, they are very hard to detect. And therefore, we might get more surprises in the future than what anyone expects. Do you mean like if groups like Hezbollah stopped using technology, that they could become more dangerous? Yeah, not only Hezbollah, basically, if you look at various groups even within, like the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups within Palestine or outside, etcetera, or even in Algeria, you look at Morocco, you look at, I mean, at the whole Muslim world.

State Power and Technology

And not only that, even at the lead, the current leader of the government, it seems probably they will shy away from using any technology. I think it depends. I really do think it depends on what country you're talking about. But if you look at the Gulf countries and if you look at Israel, clearly technology is extremely important, especially surveillance technology and the ability to monitor people and monitor telephones and how people move and so on. So I think the temptation of the power that technology gives a state its ability to monitor its people and to know what's happening is just too great.

Officials' Use of Technology

So that, you know, a country that decides, a government that decides not to use technology will be out, you know, will be essentially defeated by a group that does use technology. So I cannot imagine Middle Eastern countries not being tempted by the power of technology to control their populations. What about the officials themselves? Let me give you an example without mentioning the name of the country, etcetera, but it is a Gulf country. I recently met an official who has two phones, and one of them kind of a very weird looking device. Yeah. Which seemed like the private device where the. Or the hotline, in a sense. Yeah. While the other phone is just for me and you.

State Penetration Techniques

Yeah, yeah, no, of course. I mean, a lot of the Gulf countries have, like, an encrypted phone just for their. I. Just for officials and then another phone for, you know, other people, outsiders, friends and so on. But I think, you know, if there's a lesson to be had from what we just saw between Hezbollah and Israel is that there is no way to get around a state like Israel or the United States being able to penetrate your systems. So you have to accept that's is going to happen.

Secure Communication Practices

You have to maybe try to get the technology of yourself to be able to do it to others. But also, I think in a country like Saudi Arabia, if there's something really important that needs to be said, it's normally said in person and not by use of any mobile device or technology. I mean, electronics have you. Everyone has to assume that electronic communication is not secure. And the proof of that is what we just saw with Hezbollah. I mean, it's just astonishing how Israel has been able to penetrate, and Hezbollah is a very serious organization when it comes to electronic security.

Implications for Hezbollah

And despite that, they were able to essentially kill everybody in the movement and the leadership level by using technology. So how do you see the politics of Lebanon playing right now? Well, it's hard to say. You know, I mean, the big question is, what's the future of Hezbollah in Lebanon? Will Hezbollah be able to reconstitute itself? Will Iran? I mean, I imagine the Iranians don't want to lose this huge investment that they made since the early 1980s in the country.

Future of Hezbollah and Iran

Of course, there are still many thousands of fighters that are Hezbollah fighters, even if the leadership has been decimated. So I don't know how the Iranians will try to reconstitute this movement and also whether this movement will be as powerful and as influential in the future of Lebanon as it has been in the last quarter century or more, 30 years now at least. So it's not clear. But I imagine that there are Lebanese movements, whether amongst the Christians or amongst the Sunnis or maybe even among some of the Shia, that want to see Hezbollah defeated and at least weakened so that the Lebanese state can come back and take over the security and I of the country, and also that all politics should happen at the level of the Lebanese state rather than at the level of a militia that is under Iran's command.

Uncertainty in Lebanese Politics

So I don't think it's clear yet. We'll see how badly defeated Hezbollah is, and then I think you will be able to know whether the Lebanese are able to bring the state back, the central state back, as the principal actor of politics in the country rather than this political party and its militia.

Predictions Surrounding Leadership

The questions that I'm asking are kind of from the questions that I received. So I'm kind of trying to sum some of them up. But the questions basically are talking about that the killing of Hassan Nasrallah has been predicted, was predicted by one of his close friends historically, who kind of had a rough relationship with him over the years later, who went on tv the day before, and he literally told Hassan Nasrallah that they are going to kill him and write your will. And then there was a professor, I think Lebanese professor who teaches in French, who was on Al Jazeera TV five days ago who said that he has knowledge of certain newspapers in the United States, were preparing a file on Hassan Nasrallah because he's going to be killed.

Political Maneuvers and Reactions

And the issue here is that whether or they are questioning whether the Russians told Bashar al Assad in Syria to play low so he can survive. So in a sense, that a lot of people knew about this, and Bashar al Assad himself probably knew about it, but Syria is playing a very low key, so Bashar al Assad can survive. Any comments on this? No. I mean, what surprises me is that, you know, Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, was in his main headquarters, in the bunker of his headquarters, knowing that the Israelis have bunker buster bombs that can reach, you know, into the bunker and kill him.

Nasrallah's Vulnerability

And so it's astonishing to me that he would be there with a general from the IRGC and many high-level commanders of Hezbollah when he knows that the Israelis can do this to him. So the question is, why was he there knowing that he could be a target? I mean, he was not a stupid man. He was clearly a very intelligent Mandev. So it seems to me that, you know, there are two possible explanations.

Possible Explanations for Actions

One is that he, because of the incredible violence that Israel has inflicted on the leadership of Hezbollah, killing all the top military commanders, that he was, you know, there was a confusion and serious loss of judgment at the highest levels of Hezbollah. And so therefore, there was a fatal error made in thinking that he was safe where he was. The second possible answer is that he thought that there were rules to the game, that there were rules to engagement with Israel and that he was not going to be the target.

Historical Context of Assassination

Because if you read Israeli, like, for instance, if you read Ronan Bergman's book on targeted assassinations by Israel, one of the conclusions of the book is that it was a grave, one of the biggest mistakes that Israel ever made was to kill, assassinate Hassan Nasrallah's predecessor, Abbas Musawi, because it led to the rise of Nasrallah, who was much more effective as a leader of Hezbollah. And so therefore, you don't kill leaders because you don't know if you end up with someone worse if you do. So. So perhaps he thought he was immune from an attack, a direct attack by Israel having read this book or having someone summarize it for him.

Consequences of Misjudgment

But whatever it is, he clearly misunderstood that there were no longer any red lines when it comes to assassination and Prime Minister Netanyahu's decision to take him out. So, I mean, it's astonishing to me that he was killed and that he allowed himself to be killed by just being where he was. Whether Assad or the Russians were involved in any of this, whether the Iranians themselves delivered the information to the Israelis, who knows? But, you know that conspiracy theories are very speculative and based on very little concrete facts.

Uncertainty Surrounding Assassination

So it's impossible for me to say whether, you know, how the Israelis managed to get to him, but he clearly made a fatal mistake. Sure. Sure. So to go back to the same question about the Assad or Bashar al Assad, for him to play a very low key, I mean, do you think he was advised in advance just to kind of play low key, Orlando, because he was on. He had, like something going on about some.

Perspective on Assad's Position

He was talking about some philosophical issues that has nothing to do with reality at all. Well, I mean, the Russians clearly want Bashar al Assad to survive. He's their man in Syria. I think both the Russians and Assad don't like the overwhelming power that Iran has managed to create for itself in Syria. So perhaps the Russians and Assad find it convenient to see Iran weakened in Lebanon.

Potential Consequences of Weakening Iran

Perhaps that would lead to Iran being weakened in Syria itself, and therefore helped in some way in this attack. What's clear, though, is that I don't think Israel would attack a head of state like Bashar al Assad, because that's a whole other. I mean, openly. They may do it surreptitiously, like they perhaps did with the former president of Iran, but I don't think they would attack Assad directly.

Differentiating Targets

They killed Nasrallah. Nasrallah was not a head of state. I mean, he was a head of a militia, didn't have an official position in the government of Lebanon. So he's fair game. Abdul Malik al Houthi in Yemen is fair game because, again, he's nothing. An official of the Yemeni, of the recognized, internationally recognized government of Yemen. So I think that the Israelis make those kinds of distinctions.

Future Attacks and Strategic Distinctions

Perhaps they'll stop making them in the future, but so far they still make them between government officials and non-state actors. Here is another question. It says, doctor Anas, with all due respect, please, this question is for Doctor Heikel. We would like to know his views on the impact on energy markets. Oh, wow. That's your area of expertise.

Energy Market Implications

I know, but that was the question. And I think they really need to know, or they wanted to know what. Whatever you want to say. I mean, my view is that as long as the war is confined to Gaza and Lebanon, it's unlikely to have repercussions on global energy markets. I think if the war escalates and then involves an attack on Iran, and then Iran manages to retaliate, especially one way Iran can retaliate is against oil installations and shipping and oil ships, which they have done in the past and proven that they can do, that's a different scenario.

Scenarios for Market Impact

So I think there are two scenarios. If the war is contained only to Lebanon and Gaza and perhaps the West Bank, I don't see a direct effect on oil markets and on gas markets. But if it escalates and then gets Iran involved, then we're in a different world. If the Israelis managed to kill Abdul Malik al Houthi in Yemenite and the Houthi leadership, I think you would see an implosion of that movement and probably the end of attacks in the Red Sea and in the Arabian Sea.

Stabilizing Factors in Oil Markets

And so that would help stabilize oil markets. So you will see a decline in oil prices if those attacks stop. So it depends on where and how the war develops in terms of what effects this will have on oil markets. But that's my own view. Doctor Anas, perhaps you have a different view.

Egypt's Position and Interests

When you had technical problems. I mentioned a few points there, and once we finish the session today, I will mention a few points. But I have another question from a colleague here. He is asking about Egypt and where Egypt stands from all of this. I mean, I don't think Egypt is involved with Gaza. I don't think Egypt really is affected by what happens in Lebanon and to Hezbollah.

Perception of Iranian Influence

And if this means a weakening of Iran in the region, you know, Egypt is not going to mind that. I don't think. I know they don't want to see Iran being a dominant player or actor in Middle Eastern politics. So I don't see a direct effect on Egypt except a positive one by any weakening of Iran as a result of this attack on Hezbollah.

Palestinian State Coalition

Here is another question regarding the, a new coalition that's been formed for the Palestinian state, the UN General Assembly. Yeah. Whether this is a good thing or. A bad thing, generally speaking, it seems like they wanted to know your views on it. Yeah, I mean, I think that the, you know, countries like Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries and other countries are trying to get, you know, greater visibility for the plight of the Palestinians, trying to establish, you know, a set of conditions for, after the war in Gaza.

Reconfiguration of Palestinian Authority

I don't think anyone wants to see Hamas back in power, but they also know that the Palestinian Authority needs to be completely reconfigured and built up, you know, almost from scratch so that it is, it becomes more effective and less corrupt and more transparent as a system of governance. So I think all of this is good.

Stability and Future Outlook

And I think the Palestinian issue should not be forgotten, regardless of what happens to Hezbollah and to Iran, because, again, I am of the view that unless the Palestinian issue is addressed and addressed in a way that finally finds a solution for it, we will have permanent instability or constant periods of repeated instability in this region. And that's not good for the people of the region.

Concerns for International Stability

It's not good, certainly not good for the world and for Europe or for the Gulf countries or anybody. Here is another question saying that Netanyahu has, until the end of this or until the US elections, basically to do whatever he wanted. In a sense, he has a free hand because of the presidential election in the US. Do you think that's true?

Israel's Strategic Calculations

I'm not sure. I mean, I think that the Israeli leadership would like to. Would like to take on Iran, would like to perhaps even attack Iran, and would like to involve the United States in such an attack. So in other words, they would like to expand the war to the whole region and involve the United States.

Biden Administration's Approach

I know that the Biden administration is extremely hostile to this idea. I mean, they don't want a war with Iran. And also the Biden administration has, like the Obama administration before, always had a much more conciliatory approach to Iran. They believe that you can negotiate with Iran, that deterrence doesn't work with Iran. So they have a view that's very antithetical or opposite to the Netanyahu view of Iran. But I also think that the two different administrations that could possibly take over in the United States after the elections are, interestingly, quite different.

Potential Future Scenarios

So let me just say a word about this. So I think that President Trump, should he be re elected, will be much less aggressive when it comes to Russia and the Ukraine war. So he'll try to resolve that war and not side entirely on Ukraine's side, which I think is now a well established fact, because he says that he's friends with both President Putin and President Zelenskyy. But when it comes to the Middle East, President Trump is much more aggressive and much more anti Iran and will revert back to a policy of maximum pressure on Iran, will try to sanction iranian oil shipments. So in other words, Trump is more of a pacifist when it comes to Russia and Ukraine. He's more of a hawk when it comes to the middle east and Iran.

Comparative Analysis: Trump vs. Harris

And he will probably have someone like Mike Pompeo, who used to head the State Department, secretary of state and the CIA. In the first Trump administration, Mike Pompeo will come back, and he's very hawkish on Iran as well. Now, if it's a Harris administration, in other words, the Democrats win the elections, they will be much more hawkish and aggressive when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, but much more accommodating with Iran and trying to negotiate with Iran, like the Biden administration did, or try to do with the nuclear negotiations. So I think the israeli government will probably prefer a Trump administration over a Harris administration in the coming years because they will want a more aggressive and hawkish attitude towards Iran.

Israeli Government's Calculations

And I don't think the present elections, the immediate timing of the election, is necessarily important in the calculations of the israeli government when it came to attacking Hezbollah. And I think that the Israelis would love to drag the United States into a war with Iran if they can, regardless whether it's before or after the election. Here is another question. Do you see the United nations playing a bigger role in the region? I think they mean the Middle East.

Role of the United Nations

I don't think so. I mean, I don't think, you know, the United nations is only effective if its member states, especially if its principal member states, are willing to give it the power and influence. And I don't see the Russians and the Americans agreeing, for instance, or for that matter, the Americans and the Chinese agreeing on policy when it comes to the Middle east. And so I don't see the UN as being a very effective body in determining what happens in the Middle east except as a rubber stamp after the fact. So it can be useful after the major powers agree and their major regional powers agree on a possible solution to different conflicts.

U.S.-Iran Relations

Generally speaking, when we talk about Iran, it is very clear from various pieces of evidence that the Iranians are interested in making a deal with the United States of America, not with the president, because they got burned before. And that's the way they view it, that they had a deal with President Obama, then that deal was completely off when a new president came in, that President Trump, and therefore, they are more interested in making a deal that can be ratified with the Congress. Some people believe that the only way who can, the only one who can make that is President Trump, if the Republicans have control of both houses.

Sanctions and Energy Sector

So that's number one. Number two, when it comes to President Trump, it is very clear that he is going to reinforce the sanctions on Iran. This word reinforced is important here because the same sanctions that he imposed in the fourth quarter of 2018 are still there. So Biden did not change any of the sanctions. He just turned the blind eye. And in fact, as I mentioned, the previous space, turning the blind eye basically is probably the wrong expression here because he literally enabled Venezuela and Iran to produce more for various reasons.

Future Prospects and Reactions

So the sanctions are still there. Just Trump is going to reinforce those sanctions. And some people think this is bullish. No, it is not. And the reason why? Because President Trump will not reinforce the sanctions until he gets guarantees from the Gulf nations that they are going to compensate. Whether they will do that or not because they got burned before, that's a different story. But the idea here is he wants to get compensation from the Gulf states for any iranian losses. But what we learned historically from Iran, that this increase that we witnessed increase in exports that we witnessed in the beginning of the Biden administration was not really an actual increase.

Risks of Escalation

That was oil that most people did not see. And then it became visible after Biden took office. So we are going to see the same thing here, but the opposite, where just some of those shipments, we will not see them anymore or most of us will not see them anymore. And therefore people think, oh, wow, look, President Trump reduced the exports of Iran. Well, that's not the case. It just, they are going to go under and it's very hard to track. And most of the newspapers and most of the media outlets, basically they track this electronically. So if they turned off everything, you cannot even follow them.

Worst Case Scenarios

So the media will be reporting lower exports in this case. Generally speaking, my worst case scenario is if we end up with some of those organizations, and probably Professor Haeckel in his final remark can comment on this. If that if they are cornered, whether the Houthis or the militia in Iraq, if they are cornered and they think that's it, they might fire things about things toward the gulf or the oil installations in the Gulf just as a revenge because that's the last thing before they die or before they disappear. So that's really my worst case scenario, that if the Houthis are or the iraqi militias are cornered, they might react in a way where they affect all oil supplies.

Economic Growth Potential

But again, as I mentioned earlier, if Iran is cornered and its arms are cut, we will see large economic growth in the region and we will see growth in oil supplies and gas supplies. But the demand growth for oil and gas in the region will be way higher and therefore is going to be bullish. Doctor Haykel, your last remarks, and please, the comment on what I mentioned.

Militia Threats and Regional Stability

No, I mean, I agree with you, Doctor Anas, that there's always the possibility of the Houthis, the Iranians and other militias using their weapons against oil installations and certainly against ships, as we've seen in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. So that's a possibility. And I think that, you know, especially if they're cornered, as you said, and they see Saudi Arabia in particular, but also to some extent the UAE as allies of the United States and therefore legitimate targets of attack. And so it's important for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to have a very sophisticated missile defense system that's comparable to the one we see in Israel that can block those kinds of projectiles.

Prospects for Regional Prosperity

Now, in terms of what the future holds for the region, I agree with you that if we see the forces of the destabilizing forces, the forces that want to radicalize the region and want to spread violence, namely Iran and its militias, if we see them weakened, we're likely to see a period of stability and prosperity in the region which will be good for everyone. Whether that can be accomplished, though, whether Iran can be deterred, Iran can be contained, I'm not sure.

Challenges in Reforming Militant Groups

I mean, I think we should not be too rash and hasty in thinking that just because Hezbollah was given a very severe knockout blow in the last two weeks by Israel that this is the end of this movement or it's the end of the various militias that the Iranians have supported and planted throughout the region. The iranian investment in these militias is many decades long. It involves a lot of indoctrination, a lot of training, a lot of financial resources, and I don't think they will disappear overnight. They will take a long time for, it'll take a long time, I think, for a movement like Hezbollah or the Shia militias in Iraq or the Houthis to be defeated.

Navigating Complexity in Yemen

The Houthis maybe actually more quickly than any of the others because the Houthis depend largely one family and the leadership of a small group of Yemenis. So that could be the easiest, you know, the lowest hanging fruit in terms of victories for the Americans and for, you know, the forces of stability in the region. But the others, Hezbollah, the militias in both Syria and Iraq, that will be a much more difficult challenge. I think to defeat them will take a longer period of time and will take a sustained effort, and it will certainly take more than Israel to accomplish that.

Houthis and International Shipping

I know you and I talked about this before in a previous space, but we have many new people in this space today, so I'm going to direct this. This question is from me, not from the listeners, because we talked about it before. Do you think the Houthis will stop attacking ships if the war in Gaza stops? No, I don't think so. I think the Houthis have realized that the ability to attack ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea has given them international influence.

Houthis' Political Ambitions

And I think that the Houthis want to dominate and control Yemen. And in order to do so, they need to be able to threaten countries next door and international shipping in order to get the recognition that they want, which is that they rule Yemen and that they also want financial support from different countries to enable them to rule Yemen. So I think the Houthis have used the palestinian issue in Gaza and the crisis in Gaza and the tragedy of the Palestinian Gaza very effectively, largely to empower themselves domestically, and they will continue to.

Ongoing Houthis Tactics

And the Red Sea shipping attacks have further solidified their power and grip, their grip on power in Yemen. And they will not give that up as a tactic until they're fully in control of Yemen and have the financial resources given to them to stop attacking. So, no, the Houthis will continue until they achieve their political goals domestically, regardless of what happens in the palestinian territories.

Addressing the Houthis Threat

Using the same logic that he used before regarding the Palestinians and others, doesn't. I mean, the continued attacks on ships basically gives the whole international community a chance basically to just get rid of them, in a sense. So their chance of getting rid of them increases if they continue attacking the shipping industry. Well, I mean, the question is, how do you get rid of the Houthis? The Houthis are a bit like the Taliban or the Viet Cong, you know, in Vietnam.

Challenges in Military Solutions

I mean, they are a well entrenched group with a very powerful, I mean, powerful locally speaking militia. I mean, to get rid of them, unless you decapitate the leadership, which is, I think, what Israel is going to try to do, you're going to have a land invasion of Yemen to defeat them. And that very few countries, in fact, no countries, are willing to invade Yemen by land to fight the Houthis, because the fear is that it'll be a guerrilla war similar to the one against the Taliban and would be very costly in both blood and treasure.

Strategic Considerations

So the problem of the Houthis is not easily solved militarily, except with this one attempt to maybe decapitate the leadership, maybe that could help weaken the movement sufficiently for other Yemenis then to take over. Your final word for traders and investors who are watching this development in the Middle east, any word to them whether kind of how they should perceive the news, especially that the media is very excessive in providing the ugly picture of what's going on? Yeah, I mean, I think that.

Larger Market Forces

I mean, you're the expert here, Doctor Anas, but my feeling is that when it comes to oil markets and commodity markets, that larger forces are at play. You know, the amount of supply in the market demand from China, dynamics within OPEC and OPEC Plus, I know that recently there have been articles about the Saudis, I mean, basically hinting that Saudi Arabia might flood the market and do what they did in March 2020 in order to regain market share and to eventually boost the price of oil.

Global Oil Market Outlook

I just don't see, first of all, I don't see that happening anytime soon. I see an extension in the voluntary cuts. But I also don't think that a war in Lebanon or in Gaza factors into such big decisions about supply and demand globally. Unless again, there's an all out war with Iran, where then? Because of the possibility of disruption of supplies, because of Iran, then I think global oil markets can be effective.

Analysis of Current Conflicts

But if the war is contained to Lebanon or to Syria or to Iraq or to Yemen without direct involvement of Iran, I don't see global markets being affected. So that's my two cent. I'm glad you mentioned that, the Financial Times article, so I can end the space with it. We did have, I think were the first publication to address this.

Media Misunderstandings

And basically we told our clients it was kind of midnight in the United States when we told them basically to ignore it. There is nothing there. But still oil prices declined by $3 anyway because of it. There are several comments here, but one of them is there was no hundred dollar price target. There was none. And all the guys, even CNBC, the guys who are involved heavily with the ministers for a long time and others from various banks, et cetera, all of them went public and testified that they never heard that before.

Clarifying Market Dynamics

And they don't know where the FT came up with that hundred dollar. I know where it came from, the 100, because that hundred dollar, basically it came. There was a report from Modi that was mentioned about the budget of Saudi Arabia and they grabbed it from there. And Modi basically got it from the IMF. But the IMF basically was talking about what it takes to balance the saudi budget.

Misinterpretations and Market Effects

It has nothing to do with the oil market. It has nothing to do with any pricing at all. The idea that they want to abandon it give the impression that Saudis are going to flood the market. Like you said, Professor Haykel, that's unfounded. At the same time, what they meant was there was the unwinding of the voluntary cuts. And they are keen on unwinding the voluntary cuts.

Ongoing Market Concerns

They want to go back and unwind those voluntary cuts. And that's what the Saudis and everyone else wanted. So it seemed the journalists of the FT misunderstood the whole thing, or he repackaged the whole thing. But the issue is not only about the FT, because the day before there was a massive attack from Bloomberg. And it was a personal attack.

Managing Public Relations

And here, literally, when I say personal attack, because the writer basically was humiliated and he kind of asked for, despite that, he asked forgiveness because of his mistakes, etcetera, and his apology was rejected and he snapped. At the same time, I can assure you that the news articles that been published in 2023, that led to a major decline in prices.

Risk of Media Influence

Remember, there was an article that reduced all prices by $5 in the morning. And we ended up telling our clients, look, this is fake news, fake news. We have three, four of them, and then we have a couple of research centers basically producing research by certain researchers along the same line. I can assure you. And for those who want to contact me privately, I'll be happy to talk about it.

Investigating the Misinformation

All of them were paid. We know who paid. We know who was hired. We know who got paid even on social media, to promote those stories. So they were paid. And the question is whether this recent attack on OPEC and trying to pressure prices down, whether they were part of the same wave that we experienced before.

Closing Remarks and Insights

Professor Hayker, thank you very much for your insights today. Thank you for Attacha, for sponsoring this. Again, for those who attend our spaces, you are familiar with this. Attacha basically publishes those breaking news and various articles and various things that are in Arabic, but they are not available in the western press.

Encouragement to Follow Relevant Sources

And therefore, when you see me retweeting, or if you follow them, just press that translate button. I think this is one of the best buttons that Twitter has, or x has. Press that translate button and you get the news even before the Wall street journal and waiters in many cases. And there are specific news to the Middle east that are important to traders and investors.

Anticipating Future Publications

And they are not published in the western press. They are published in Attacha. So please follow attacha and use that press the translate button and follow Professor Haeckel too. And I think we are waiting for his book. And I think when is going to be published, by the way?

Conclusion of the Discussion

Late next year. And who is the publisher? Penguin. Nice. Nice. So we are all looking forward to reading it. And thank you again and good luck with your trip. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. And thank you, Attacha. Thank you, Mohammed from Cairo. Thank you all for attending today.